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Abstract
A new form of computation is emerging rapidly with cloud computing, mobile computing,
wearable computing and the Internet-of-Things. All can be characterized as a class of
“Cooperative Distributed Systems” (CDS) in open environment. A major driver of the
growth is the exponential adoption by people and organizations within all aspects of their
day-to-day matters. In this context, users’ requirements for privacy protection are becoming
essential and complex beyond the traditional approaches. This requires a formal treatment of
“privacy” as a fundamental computation concept in CDS paradigm.
The objective is to develop a comprehensive formal model for “privacy” as base to build a
CDS based framework and platform in which various applications allow users to enjoy the
comprehensive services in open environments while protecting their privacy seamlessly. To
this end, this thesis presents a novel way of understudying, modeling and analyzing privacy
concerns in CDS. A formal foundations and model of privacy is developed within the context
of information management. This served as a base for developing a privacy protection
management framework for CDS. It includes a privacy-aware agent model for CDS platform
with the ability to support interaction-based privacy protection.
The feasibility of the proposed models has been demonstrated by developing an agent-based
CDS platform using JIAC framework and a privacy-based Contract Net Protocol. It also
included the application scenarios for the framework for privacy protection is Internet-ofThings, cloud-based resource scheduling and personal assistance within the project of smart
space.

Keywords
Cooperative Distributed System (CDS), Interaction, Privacy, Sensitive Information,
Computation.
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Symbols and Notations
The following is the list of symbols and notation frequently used in this work.
Notation/Symbol

Concept

𝑊

World that is a CDS-based environment

ei

A computation entity in CDS environment
i: is the entity identity

Ii

Set of information that is owned by 𝑒𝑖
i: is the entity identity

𝑂i

Set of operations that is owned by 𝑒𝑖
i: is the entity identity

𝐸𝑖,𝑘

Exposure Boundary of Ii,k that includes entities for which sharing
Ii,k can take place without causing privacy concern.
i: is the entity identity
k: is the information identifier

𝐼 𝑆 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , ej )

𝐼𝑖,𝑘 is Sensitive in relation with ej from ei perspective
i: is the entity identity that owns the information
j: is the entity identifier that does not belong to 𝐸𝑖,𝑘
k: is the information identifier

𝑜̿ (Ix1 , Iaux , Ix2 )

Executing Operation (o) on explicit information Ix1 to transform the
implicit information to explicit form of Ix2

̃
𝑜̿ (Ix1
, Iaux )

Preventing/Neutralizing Execution of operation (𝑜) on Ix1 given the
auxiliary information Iaux

S(Ii,k , ej )

Sharing Ii,k with ej
i: is the entity identifier that owns the information
j: is the entity identifier that receives Ii,k
k: is the information identifier

D(Ii,k , ej )

Disclosure of Ii,k to ej
i: is the entity identifier that owns the information
j: is the entity identifier that Ii,k is disclosed to
k: is the information identifier
xii

𝑂̂𝑗𝑖,𝑘

Non Authorized operations in 𝑂𝑗 that can be applied on Ii,k
i: is the entity identifier that owns the information
j: is the entity identifier that Ii,k is disclosed to
k: is the information identifier

𝑂̂𝑗𝑖

All possible non authorized operations in relation with ej
i: is the entity identifier that owns the information
j: is the entity identifier that can receive information from 𝑒𝑖

𝑖,𝑘
̂ i,k
Privacy Violation of ei by ej disobeying the agreement θi,j between
PV(ej , Ii,k , O
j , 𝜃𝑖,𝑗 )
ei and ej by executing a non-authorized operations belonging to
̂ i,k
O
j on Ii,k

PP(ej , (PS(Ii )), 𝑂̂𝑗 ) Privacy protection of ei when Ii is the space and 𝑂̂𝑗 is all possible
non authorized operations in ej
μ

Privacy Protection Mechanism

μ̿

Applying privacy protection mechanism

PPL(ej , Ii , μ)

PPL: probability of privacy protection of e𝑖 using μ protection
mechanism in interaction with ej

𝐼𝑃

Interaction protocol

𝑅∗

Participating Entities in an interaction protocol

𝐼𝑖𝑠

All sensitive information in e𝑖 in relationship with entities in 𝑅 ∗

𝑆𝑀

Sequences of messages in an interaction protocol

𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡

Sub-sequences of a sequence
q: Sequence identifier
t: sub-sequence identifier

𝑜
𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡

All operations of a sub-sequence
q: Sequence identifier
t: sub-sequence identifier

𝑜 (𝑀)
𝑠𝑠
̿ 𝑞,𝑡

Execution of operations of a subsequence
q: Sequence identifier
t: sub-sequence identifier

𝜇𝑖,𝑘

Protection Operation in a computation entity that is applied for
protecting 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 that is classified as sensitive

xiii
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Computation history is replete with changes in how people regard, use and interact with
computers. With the recent evolution of computation from the colossal machines to the
ever-present digital era that is characterized by technologies such as nanotechnologies,
quantum computing, cloud-based computing, mobile computing and the new area of
computation known as Internet-of-Things (IoT), a great paradigm shift through which
many technological services have become part of nearly every human activity. In spite of
the beneficial comforts that are experienced due to these technological services, the use
of information technology reveals the extent to which there could be a risk to privacy.

1.1 Cooperative Distributed System and Privacy Concerns
In an increasingly interconnected, intricate and quickly changing world, more entities
choose to connect and do business online. Both people and businesses are engaging with
various applications and because of this, it is envisioned that a significant part of our lives
will be steered by computation systems in near future. It is estimated that in 2020, there
will be 6.58 smart internet-connected devices for each person [1]. Despite the
development of computation environments in delivering services to people and
businesses, privacy is still a major challenge in these environments [2], [3].
The evolution of Cooperative Distributed Systems (CDS) created new forms of
computation that instituted the significant advances, involvement and tremendous
impacts of information technology on peoples’ lives. In CDS, autonomous self-interested
entities require the capabilities of others, resulting in interaction and exchange of
information between these entities. It is envisioned that information is collected by many
processes and devices and hence has brought increased risks regarding the concerns on
one’s privacy. Information about people is gathered through many service providers,
stored in various infrastructures, analyzed and reported for further objectives [4]. The
information is manipulated towards extracting and disseminating the information to other
parties or serving various interests. For example, smart house applications capture sensor
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information from separate parts of the building. Some of these sensors might collect the
electrical consumption rate of each apartment. The smart house manager application may
collect this information and send it to the power company. The aggregated view of this
information from all apartments in question can be used for designing and distributing
power plans in neighborhoods. However, the individualized type of this information can
reveal the time that householders are not available at their home based on identifying the
pattern of lowest consumption rate at each apartment. This suggests that disseminating
some information such as the individualized view of the power consumption can lead to
additional information about them. This also illustrates that the exchange of information
among entities in CDS environments can cause a level of concern from these entities for
their privacy. In particular, in open CDS environments, it would be a strong assumption
that entities in the environment will have a degree of respect for the privacy of others.
The computation in distributed heterogeneous environments that are modeled as CDS
occurs during interaction between entities where the information is shared. This entails
capturing privacy at the computation level [5]. This view is contrary to the traditional
approaches towards privacy through which the application filters the computation
solutions based on predefined rules [6], [7]. The privacy models can be classified into
two main categories: rule-based approaches and architectural-based approaches [8].
Privacy solution models that evolve from rule-based approaches are typically designed
for stable, low variant environments. These approaches mainly concentrate on applying
rules onto information that is collected during the process of sharing. Due to the open
environment assumption in many applications of CDS, the rule-based approaches [9] are
not sufficient [8], [10]. Information processing has been the engine of extracting
information by applying operations on it. This information is not necessarily captured in
rule-based privacy models. Furthermore, since the rules and policies can impose
limitation of the design and dynamism of the environments, many open CDS
environments cannot adopt these perspectives on privacy.
Among architectural-based privacy solutions are anonymization techniques [11], [12],
[13], privacy utility trade off mechanisms, [5], [14], [15] social tradeoffs and proxy-based
privacy protection [16]. In this context, the anonymization techniques are limited to
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particular settings that include a trusted information collector entity and non-continuous
information dissemination processes for which it cannot be adopted by open CDS
environments [17]. The work in [16] illustrates that privacy utility trade off models do
not necessarily reflect the preferences that each entity might have over their privacy. The
utility tradeoff mechanisms have been applied in contexts such as smart power grid in
which privacy is reduced to limited access to individualized signal from the aggregated
view of the collected signal [15]. These models also evolved with approaches for
measuring the risk of privacy concerns. Such risk adheres to the execution of operations
that causes privacy concern but it can measure the probability of the entity’s information
being used [18]. In all cases, the limitation of the proposed models indicates the lack of
adequate privacy model for CDS.
It is noteworthy that privacy is correlated with the interaction aspects of computation
systems. This asserts that privacy is a computation concept that is related to the
interaction process and can be adequately addressed by interaction protocols. For
instance, if a specific entity 𝑒𝑖 can reach solution 𝑆1 by acquiring the capabilities of
entity 𝑒𝑗 , the devised interaction protocol for such engagement has to coordinate the
pertinent activities with 𝑒𝑗 . However, during this engagement, 𝑒𝑗 may exploit the
information as part of the messages in the interaction protocol and thus could result in
privacy concern for 𝑒𝑖 . Capturing privacy as a concept in interactions still adheres to the
mechanism of interaction as well as finding solutions that may not be conducive to
privacy concerns for the participant entities.

1.2 Privacy: Concepts, Issues and Models
Privacy is an ethical, a social and a legal concept that has gained substantial definitions.
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines privacy as “the state of being alone: the state of
being away from other people” while the Oxford Dictionary defines it as “the state in
which one is not observed or disturbed by other people”. In all definitions, privacy
becomes an inherent feature of an environment of multiple people (entities/agents) or a
setting of decentralized entities/agents. Decentralized computation environments can be
adequately molded as CDS [19].
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In an information management model of computation, “privacy” contains some specific
connotations though in many ways the term is similar to how it is generally understood.
In communication-based interaction among entities, it becomes a privacy concern when
sensitive information flows outside the entity or the unit of entities in CDS. Evidently, it
will be a more difficult challenge in CDS in particular when communication-based
interactions are applied in open environments.
Motivated by the computational view on privacy, understanding privacy concept that can
be applied in contexts such as CDS requires formal analysis of privacy. The work in [20]
proposes a formal approach for capturing privacy in information management in the
context of social networks. However, the analysis stays at formulating the norms and
relationship of the roles, and the concept of privacy is not clearly stated. In addition, the
concept of norms and contexts can be implicit and exist in gray areas when it comes to
social networks [21]. In another work in [22], an extensive grammar and syntax of a
language is provided for expressing the privacy policies enforced by HIPPA through
which privacy becomes limited to policy context that is applied. Different approaches and
many privacy models have been proposed to deal with relevant privacy issues [23], [7],
[24]. However; to our knowledge, none of these approaches have treated and captured
privacy at the computational level adequate for the CDS environments.
There have been significant efforts towards building a foundation for privacy rights
during digital interactions. This enables an understanding of privacy and adopting the
associated concepts based on practices in information technology law [25], [26]. Many
countries have enacted laws and legislations to protect people’s privacy. For instance, the
Canadian law has several legal acts that oblige service providers and consumers to be
responsible on respecting privacy as a right for people. Canadian Information Privacy Act
and Access to information are among these legal supports. Furthermore, some privacy
models were motivated by the supporting legal scenarios and rules [22]. Due to
limitations on the setting of the rules and scenarios, employing these models impose
closed assumption on the environment.
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1.3 Scope of the thesis
A major objective of this work is to conduct a deep analysis of “privacy” and to develop
a formal model and computation concepts of privacy concerns. Also, it attempts to utilize
the formal model to develop a privacy protection frame work for CDS-based
applications.
In many cases privacy studied and treated in conjunction or within the context of
“security” and “trust”. Although practically these concepts might be directly related,
within this thesis, however, our focus was on analyzing the foundation of privacy and
developing a fundamental model as computation concept in CDS paradigm. Our belief is
privacy is an intrinsic concept. In this work, privacy is viewed within the context of
managing information manipulation, in particular “sensitive” information, within a given
exposure boundary, for a given of security and trust measurements. Where, “security”
mechanisms concern about the truthfulness of the communication within the areas of
confidentiality, integration and availability. And “trust” is defined as the degree of belief
of reliability among entities in a particular context. This direction makes the principle
foundations of our findings expandable to model and address situations where security
and trust are involved.

1.3.1 Formal Privacy Model
The lack of a formal privacy model that is applicable for a CDS was the motivation to
develop a formal treatment of privacy in CDS environments. The proposed model is used
as an analytical tool to evaluate the state of the privacy during any entity’s interaction.
Entities discern the sensitivity of information differently depending on the recipients of
the information in an interaction. Sensitive information perceived by one entity might be
considered totally as a non-sensitive in relation to another. Entities tend to not share
information, when it is labeled as sensitive. This creates an exposure boundary for
entities’ information which positions privacy as the state of the exposure boundary of the
information. Information within the exposure boundary is non-sensitive but becomes
sensitive when it exists outside of the exposure boundary.
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Information exists in explicit form. However, it can be classified as implicit information
when it is in conjunction with operations. Operations can retrieve explicit information by
processing the said information. The execution of operations transforms the implicit
information to explicit form. Through this, information might be transferred to outside of
the exposure boundary and become sensitive. This implies that the concern with privacy
is about the disclosure of sensitive implicit information. For example, various IaaS
(Infrastructure as a Service) [27] providers serve their consumers by offering them
resources, including memory, storage, and computational power, among others. In many
forms of IaaS service delivery models, payment packages (pay per user) are based on the
demand of entities. When it is not serving a higher priority consumer, economical
packages receive response from the server. The advantage of costly packages is the
guarantee of service at any time. Hence, serving an economical plan at the server
implicitly implies not having a high priority job. Sharing scheduling information may
enable an entity with medium priority and a resource-demanding job to acquire the
service provider. Frequent preemption for lower priority consumers may lead to service
blocking. This explains that sharing the schedule is not sensitive when in possession of
the scheduler, but it is sensitive to share with other consumer entities.
In this work, we have provided an original privacy model that formally captures the
concepts and concerns about privacy. Within this model, privacy concerns, privacy
violation and privacy protection are formally explained and the necessary concepts to
develop a framework for privacy protection management are introduced.

1.3.2 Privacy Protection Management Framework
By employing the proposed privacy model, we established a privacy protection
management framework that incorporates privacy protection mechanisms at the
interaction level. Because achieving perfect privacy protection requires complete
knowledge about the world, we proposed quasi protection mechanism that can protect
privacy with a certain level of probability that is addressed as Privacy Protection Level
(PPL).
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The framework captures the information of entities and accordingly evaluates the
exposure boundaries associated to information. Consequently, it identifies the sensitive
information and determines the necessary extension form for privacy protection. Using
the PPL measure of each mechanism, the PPL of the privacy-based interaction protocol is
evaluated and this enables applications to adopt privacy mechanisms that generate an
acceptable level of PPL at the interaction level. It is formally proven in this work that the
protection can sufficiently occur at the interaction level and the privacy-based interaction
protocol has quantifiable PPL.

1.3.3 Privacy-Aware Computation Platform
In order to capture privacy at the computation platform, it has to be treated as a
mathematical object. The computation system reduces the available solution choices to
the ones that can fulfill the expected privacy requirements. The quantifiable model for
privacy concept allows filtering the solutions space based on privacy measures as well as
maximizing the privacy protection in interactions among entities. For example,
scheduling solutions collect scheduling variables and boundaries to reach to global
schedule for the participant entities. Typically, privacy concerns are not incorporated as
the scheduling criteria for which the schedule might not be acceptable. The computation
view on privacy enables scheduler to capture privacy as solution boundaries or decision
variables that results in scheduling solutions for which privacy is protected. This example
will be discussed in more details in Chapter 7.
The proposed privacy protection framework can be applied as an analytical tool to
evaluate the state of privacy in interactions of entities as well as being applied at contexts
such as computation. The computation entity employs the privacy protection
management to extent the interaction protocol to a privacy-based interaction protocol
through which the solution inherit privacy at the computation. We have formally proven
that the resolution to privacy is part of the computation solution. In this work, we have
extended the computation entity in an agent-based model [19] by introducing the privacy
protection management and implemented the privacy-aware entity using the Java-based
Intelligent Agent Componentware (JIAC) platform [28].
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Privacy is an immense area of research that has attracted many researchers, scientists and
developers within the computer science and engineering arenas. The tremendous work
devoted on the perspectives of the authorization and rule management within underlying
infrastructure [27], [6], privacy related concepts and the challenge with the new
technologies [22], taxonomy of privacy affairs [29], [10], privacy categorization and
personally identifiable information [8], privacy within the context of information
management including information collection, information processing and information
dissemination [23, 30], [31]. There also have been some attempts in formalizing the
languages used for privacy policies [22]. The economic mechanisms have been applied in
this area as well with the objective of developing strategies through which privacy
protection would be a dominant strategy [32]. Furthermore, privacy has been the concern
of multi-agent systems. Agents interact on behalf of their principals, engage in a number
of activities and exchange information, which inevitably raises issues and concerns with
regard to privacy[16]. Our research has contributed in several aspects of these areas,
which is shared with privacy in information management, formalizing privacy concepts,
personally identifiable information, privacy concepts and categorization and privacy
within multi-agent systems.
A major contribution of this work is to develop a privacy-aware computation in open
Cooperative Distributed Systems that addresses and manages privacy at the interaction
level and thus provides a certain degree of privacy protection at the interactions of
entities. The work introduces several new original and novel ideas that contribute to the
overall thesis that can be listed as follows:
1) The formal modeling of privacy in the context of information management
Formal analysis of privacy concepts is essential in capturing privacy as a computation
concept. In this work, we have investigated privacy within the context of information
management and sensitive information. Our attempts in understanding privacy in this
context results in developing a formal model that delivers a complete view on privacy in
information management.
2) An Interaction-based Privacy Protection Management Framework.
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Considering the incomplete knowledge of entities in open CDS environments, privacy
protection is encountered with an uncertainty level. To deal with the uncertainty, a
probability-based model is applied. The privacy protection framework enables managing
the expected level of privacy protection within the interactions of entities. The proposed
solution for protecting privacy has been congregated within an architectural approach
towards interaction-based framework for privacy protection in which the privacy
protection mechanisms are applied to interactions as it is required.
3) Expressing privacy as a computation concept.
The privacy concept is formally treated at the computation level by including privacy in
the computation solution. As a result, the computation entity adopts the privacy
protection management as part of the computation entity architecture.
4) A Privacy-Based Interaction Protocol
Applying privacy protection management framework on interaction protocols allows
identifying privacy concerns at the interactions. It evaluates the messages and sequences
of the interaction protocol and provides adequate protection operations within the
interaction protocol that result in privacy-based interaction protocol. The extended
privacy based interaction protocol that is generated by applying the privacy protection
management framework can sufficiently provide privacy protection in situations where
the knowledge in CDS environment is incomplete. One of the interaction protocols that
are utilized within this framework is Contract Net protocol (CNP). CNP is a negotiation
based interaction protocol that is designed for distributed problem solving. Due to
privacy concerns in this protocol, we have applied the privacy protection management
framework that resulted in a privacy-based Contract Net interaction protocol.
5) A Quantifiable Privacy Protection Level for the privacy based interaction
protocol.
With the proposed approach in the privacy protection management framework, the
protection level of the mechanisms can be measured and can hence provide quantified
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values. As a result, the privacy based interaction protocol is able to define the level of
privacy protection that the protocol provides.
6) Applying the privacy aware computation entity in a Service Oriented Semantic
Driven Architecture (SOSDA) Environment.
The proposed privacy-aware computation entity can be integrated with CSD-ENG smart
space applying SOSDA principals [33] where the interaction protocol is providing the
privacy protection. The implementation challenges of expanding the Collaborative
Intelligent Rational (CIR) agent architecture to include privacy solutions as part of the
computation solution are elaborated and resolved in Java-based Intelligent Agent
Component Ware (JIAC) [28].

1.4 Organization of Thesis
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview on privacy
in different areas of research. Chapter 3 provides a novel approach for a formal modeling
of privacy. Subsequently, Chapter 4 proposes a privacy protection management
framework. Chapter 5 elaborates on privacy-aware computation platform by expanding
the computation entity and its implementation challenges. Chapter 6 presents the
application of the privacy protection management framework on Contract Net protocol.
The applicability of the proposed privacy protection management framework in various
different environments and application domains is outlined in Chapter 7. The future work
and the conclusion of this work is presented in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review

2

Despite the comfort that is experienced with new information technologies, they have
imposed privacy concerns on people and businesses. The more people engage with digital
developments, the more are concerns for their privacy. Primarily, privacy concerns were
studied and practiced in legal communities and researches. However, privacy has become
inseparable challenge of nowadays’ digital interactions in which it carries tremendous
amount of information about people. Many disciplines have addressed privacy in their
solutions however, adequate privacy models for CDS environments is still a challenge.

2.1 Privacy In law1
Privacy is a multi-disciplinary concept that is mainly tented within Law researches and
legal schemes. Understanding privacy from the perspective of law enables us to observe
and perceive privacy concerns in the context of information management. There are
various views about privacy among different categories of law. One believes privacy is
the product of the modern life where gossips became curiosity while another claims that
privacy is as old as common law [25]. The work in [36] indicates that privacy is often
interpreted as security and it is traded in return for providing security for the society or
individual [26]. The concept of privacy has been studied in four main categories [25]:

1



Common Law



Constitutional Law



Statutory Law



International Law

The term “Privacy Violation” has been used here to reflect the concept addressed in the law. This term
will be formally defined later in the next chapters.
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Due to dynamic context of privacy, challenge in front of legal scholars is defining
privacy rights which, in many cases are typically abstract and vague [25]. Researchers in
legal areas try to retrieve the potentials of the existing law to propose solutions for
protecting privacy and evaluate Law responses to new subjects such as privacy rights.
Traditionally, privacy was treated as “decisional privacy” which mainly concerns the
liberty of decisions about one’s body and family. Nonetheless, because of the role of
technology in spreading information about people and organizations and the direct effect
of privacy in ones’ lives, it has become the priority in legislative agenda in Congresses.
History of privacy rights indicates multiple stories about people and organizations in
which dissemination of information can directly target individuals’ lives [25].
One of the main achievements in Privacy Law is presenting it as one’s “Rights”. The
main issue in the current technology is the presence of medias that are utilized for
circulating information. Such trend increases the effect of privacy in people’s lives.
Therefore, attorneys typically address privacy rights in the area of “common law”. The
objective is to protect privacy of private lives from unwanted intrusion. Accordingly,
there are four type of intrusion in interaction of people and society [25]:
1. Intrusion upon seclusion and solitude.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts.
3. Publicity which exposes people in a false light in public.
4. Appropriation for people’s interests.
As people’s lives are now virtually available among various type of services and data
sources, it would become essential for these services to adapt their solution in alignment
with common law. However, privacy rights are not limited to common law and people’s
private life. More importantly, privacy concerns are not only about people. It can also be
applied on how machines and software interact which can be addressed in information
privacy. In this section, we try to extract the necessary foundation for privacy interactions
so that we can associate them in general interaction among entities in CDS.
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In attempt to identify the interactions that result in privacy violation from law
perspective, four types of violation categories are presented above. Each of which can
represent various circumstances that individuals or machines confront in open
environments. For instance, the first category asserts on respecting people’s solitude and
private avocations. This implies that the actions performed by an entity in its private life
are being monitored by another entity apart from their awareness. This is equivalent to
the privacy concerns related to “information collection” and “information processing”.
Currently, digital life is an inseparable part of individuals’ activities [25]. However,
mainly, all the individual’s online private affairs and activities are usually monitored and
recorded by service providers. Software and machines are installed in many locations to
observe and analyze human interactions. The motivations supporting these systems are
tailored to improving business, security, better consumer support, safety, efficiency and
many human perspectives. Yet, such motivations has brought about and created a
tremendous challenge related to privacy in Cyberspace. Nonetheless, legal efforts are
directed to finding solutions that can mitigate the issue by eliminating unnecessary
monitoring and controlling tasks. The second Category implies the concern of public
exposure of information, which might cause humiliation and embarrassments for
individuals [25]. This is due to the sharing an individual’s information to others without
having the necessary consent. This form of privacy concerns is referred as secondary use
whenever a third party is involved. With the explosion of Internet Media and personal
pages in various web sites, individuals experience levels of disconcertion when their
information is used in other contexts. Personal information is excessively spreading
among Internet services and in noticeable amount of cases; it has been disseminated to
other providers or publicly exposed.
Similar to the second category, the third category of intrusion occurs when disclosing
false information entails the attraction of unnecessary attention to individuals [25].
Suppose in a reputation system built for auctions, an entity gets false negative feedback;
it is without doubt that such falsification impact further future activities with this entity.
Spreading false information about capabilities and availability of a service provider in a
grid environment can forge the scheduling mechanism and hence may overload a
provider or disrupt the whole scheduling system.
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The last category of intrusion discusses the appropriation of exposing individuals’
interest information [25]. Due to the possibility of extracting personal information about
people by processing their interests in various subjects, interest information become
sensitive. Given the growth of targeting advertisement, interest information is valuable to
advertisers. This could exhibit levels of privacy concerns when the interest information is
not appropriate.
As argued in [25], the challenge in investigating privacy violation is distinguishing the
discussed aforementioned categories. For simplicity, they are addresses respectively as 1)
intrusion, 2) disclosure, 3) false light and 4) appropriation. In spite of the similarity
among these categories, they have characteristics that assist in separating the concepts.
For instance, in intrusion and disclosure, existence of secret information is part of the
scenario. In disclosure and false light, the publicity is the main element. However, in
false light, falsified information or fiction differentiates it from disclosure. Appropriation
typically involves in providing advantages for the owner of information [25].
Borrowing the intrusion categories in common low, similar concerns exist in cyber space.
Among them are: “Breach of Confidentiality”, “Defamation”, “Infliction of emotional
distress” and “privacy of home” [25].
Breach of Confidentiality”: this term commonly is used to define the revealing of
patients’ and client’s information [25]. In this context, the patient is the consumer entity
and the doctor is the service provider. If the service provider breaches the confidentiality
of the information, it has disseminated the information to a third party without having the
consent of the consumer.
Defamation refers to disrupting individuals’ reputation by false information [25], where
Infliction of emotional distress is related to the emotional discomfort that individuals
experience when their sensitive information is shared in social networks and similar
communication mediums.
The Privacy of home concept addresses the physical resident of individuals. This is
associated with ones’ solitude and private affair that are well established in common law.
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This type of privacy concern can infiltrate to individuals’ digital interactions when their
information is spread across various sectors in machine.

2.2 Privacy in Information Management
Privacy has been defined from the perspective of multiple views. For example privacy
has been interpreted as: “the freedom of thought”, “having control over one’s body”, “the
solitude in one’s home, “the freedom from surveillances”, “the protection of one’s
reputation”, “protecting one from searches and interrogation” and “not selling one’s
information” [29]. Also, there are fundamental legal privacy theories such as: Privacy is
the limited access to self [34], privacy is the right to be left alone [35], secrecy in many
legal communities were accepted as definition for privacy [36], Control over personal
information [37], Intimacy and Personhood [38] also were numerated as theories of
privacy. In addition, the work in [10] addressed privacy as “the condition of being
protected from unwanted access by others” [38]. Similarly, the work in [9] defines the
privacy as the right to determine “to what extent information about people or companies
is communicated to others”. Adopting similar concepts in the context of information,
privacy can be adequately treated in “information management” in CDS environments.
Entities in CDS autonomously interact and share information through which it can be
processed or disseminated. Due to self-interestedness and autonomy of the entities in
CDS settings, there might be privacy concern at each of the levels of information
management.
Information management can be categorized based on the nature of actions or operations
applied including [29]:


Information Collection: the process of compiling information such as
surveillance, online profiling, online tracking, collecting task specification and
requirements.



Information processing: applying operations on information such as aggregation,
integration and identification.
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Information dissemination: the process of publishing or diffusing information to
other entities such as breach of confidentiality and increased accessibility.

2.2.1 Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
Information or attributes such as SIN numbers and personal number can be used to
identify entities. Some attributes can be used in combination of others to identify an
entity; for example, combination of date of birth, gender, name and zip code. The
attributes that directly identify the entities are called “identified” and the attributes that
can [implicitly] result in identifying an entity are called “Personally Identifiable
Information” (PII). In this context, attribute disclosure happens when the value of
identifiable information reveals the identity of the entity. And, identity disclosure
happens when the identifiable information is a bridge to associate sensitive attributes to
an entity[39]. The challenge is that due to advances in technology and information
processing which can convert the non-PII attributes to PII attributes at higher scale, it
becomes not possible to directly identify PII[8].
Entities’ incomplete knowledge in open environments originates the concern on the
operations that might be applied on shared information. Combining information by
applying operations to extract new information is known as a secondary use problem.
This could lead to privacy concerns when the retrieved information is sensitive and the
information includes the identifier to the owner of the sensitive information. This issue
which is functionally equivalent to the PII problem is due to implicitly extracting
information from identifiable information that is shared [40],[10]. Resolving the PII
problem has been investigated in three approaches; reduction, expansion and PII2.0.
Reduction focuses more on “identified” attributes. For example, COPPA (Children
Online Privacy Protection Act) concerns only with information about “identified person”.
In fact, the “identifiable” concept has been reduced from this approach. In the Expansion
approach, the identifiable information is considered as critical as identified information.
However, as almost any kind of information can be attributed to an identified entity, and
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from the practicality point of view, this approach is considered as a flaw. This is the
2

result of treating the identified and identifiable information equally[40] .
PII 2.0 is an approach for privacy in interactions that deals with PII problem through the
perspective of risk analysis. Although, there are large amount of identifiable information,
that could implicitly retrieve new identified information, not all of them have a high risk
of privacy concerns. PII 2.0 introduces the risk of revealing information as a relative
probability measure. If the risk of a set of identifiable information is high, then
information should not be shared [40]. The risk of interaction is probabilistic view of the
occurrence of associated negative impact of privacy concerns on the entity. It allows
decision-making processes to evaluate the interaction and the sharing information with
regards to the risk of interaction, gain and the possible drawback that might affect the
entity.
In new forms of resolutions for PII complications, there are rule-based and standardbased approaches. Typically, the rule-based approaches are convenient when the area of
social and technological development have reached a fairly stable state [13]. Due to the
dynamic and open nature of environments in CDS, the rule-based solutions to resolve PII
are not adequate approaches.

2.2.2 Human Everyday Privacy Model
In every day interactions, humans follow a conceptual privacy model that is affected by
perception of humans on internal and external factors. Internal factors include [41]:


Information Sensitivity (IS): entity’s judgment on the sensitivity of the
information



Information Receiver (IR): entity’s evaluation on the level of “trust” to the
recipients of the information

2

The concepts related to identified and identifiable information are formally treated as explicit and implicit
information that are discussed in more details in Chapter 3.
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Information Usage (IU): entity’s assessment over the gain of using information or
the cost of the mistreatment of the information.

Additionally, there are external factors such as Laws (L), Market (M), Norms (N), and
Architecture (A) [technological context of communication] of the interaction, Contextual
variables (C) [set of traditional contextual variables such as activity, location,
companions,.., etc.] that can impact the perception of humans over their privacy state.
Therefore, the everyday conceptual privacy can be modeled as[41]:
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝐿, 𝑀, 𝑁, 𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐼, 𝐼𝑆, 𝐼𝑅, 𝐼𝑈)
Where 𝐼 is the shared information. The combination of L, M, N, A, C, I, IS, IR, IU can
be interpreted as “situation”. This reduced the model to [1]:
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
Due to similarity of preferences of humans over different situations, the work in [1]
captures the similarities as “Face”.
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒 = 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
The “faces” will become different in various contexts. Also, the variables affecting the
“situation” might be numerous [1]. This results in difficulties and inconveniences in
capturing and applying the “Face” model in CDS environments where entities have
distinctive interdependencies.

2.3 Privacy in Distributed Systems
Within the arena of distributed systems, privacy is a concern when the setting of the
environment is decentralized. Distributed Systems can be classified in more granular
categories that we address a few of them and discussed the related privacy models.

2.3.1 Privacy in Authorization Framework
Security and privacy in many cases have been interchangeably used where privacy is
treated in the context of security. Traditionally, in the context of information
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management, privacy was investigated at security authorization mechanisms[9], [42].
Despite security mechanisms that are targeted to maintaining confidentiality, integrity
and availability of the communication among entities, privacy concerns are about
manipulating the information that could have been securely communicated [shared]. The
efforts within security mechanisms are geared towards assuring the information is to be
only accessible by the desired entity, and the entities’ communication is not compromised
with a third party. However, security mechanisms may not address the manipulation of
information among entities. For instance, the communication with a search engine can
have the required security measures and the integrity of the communication is supported.
Nonetheless, the information that is retrieved by the search engine after applying
operations on the collected information is not treated in security mechanisms. This
indicates that the nature of security mechanisms is not sufficient to resolve privacy
concerns. Privacy concerns are categorized on the control over “how” information is
collected, processed and disseminated. Typically, the security mechanisms are applied on
the established connection between at least two entities. If the confidentiality, integrity
and availability of the communicated information are satisfied, that interaction is secured.
Nevertheless, that does not guarantee that there is not privacy concerns with the
interaction.
Diverse set of models has been applied on authorization in CDS such as SAML, Akenti,
PERMIS, Shibboleth, VOMS, XACML, GT4 [9] and [42]. The objective of these models
is to provide authorization platforms that protect information from unauthorized access.
However, these models are still incapable of addressing privacy in relation with “how”
information is processed and “flow” within entities. Additionally, the solutions do not
provide privacy protection techniques for the collection and the dissemination of
information. The work in[42] addresses privacy as part of the populated rules for the
authorization mechanism. However, the model does not capture the identifiable
information that implicitly can lead to privacy concerns. In addition, the setting of the
applied model in this mechanism is assumed to include trusted entities to govern the
privacy rules. Such setting is not necessarily attainable in all CDS environments and the
privacy model cannot be applied.
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2.3.2 Privacy in Multiple Data Sources
Data source providers provide aggregated view of the information that is collected from
people, business, and organizations. Typically, this information is published for research
collaboration purposes and data analysis for a particular problem. However, the process
of information collection can be pursued if exclusively, the aggregated information is
published. Disclosing information such as the participation of an entity in the information
collection process can lead to privacy concern for the entity. Many public data sources
contain information that might be common across multiple data sources. Linking the
available information across multiple data sources is based on their common information
can identify individuals and disclose sensitive information which can be captured as
identity disclosure and attribute disclosure [43], [12]. These concepts depend on
contextual variables, amount of released data, level of the knowledge of adversary[39],
[13]. Given this categorization, there are different privacy models that address specific
aspects of privacy. Models such as K-Anonymity [11], l-Diversity [12], SIPPA [13], tcloseness [44] and Differential Privacy [38] aim to resolve identity or attribute
disclosure. The typical setting of anonymization mechanisms includes a trusted
information collector that collects the information and disseminates aggregated
information to other entities [23], [44]. There are assumptions in this setting that the
information collector is a trusted party and the process of information collection and
dissemination happens in non-continuous fashion [45]. These mechanisms are tailored
towards protecting sensitive information such as participation of entities in information
collecting process. The adversary consumes the aggregated information in conjunction
with previous knowledge to retrieve sensitive information about an entity. Evidently, not
all CDS applications can adhere to the setting of anonymization mechanism.
Furthermore, because of possibilities of attacks such as complementary attack in KAnonymity[43], these approaches are not applicable in CDS. In complementary attack,
the adversary accesses the published anonymized information in multiple sources and
combines them all. This in many cases circumvents the protection that is applied.
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2.3.3 Privacy in Distributed Constraint Satisfaction
Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DisCSP) is a Constraint Satisfaction
Problem (CSP) in which the variables and constraints are distributed among distributed
multiple entities (i.e., Agents). Those agents need to determine values for a set of
variables such that the cost of a set of constraints over the variables is sataisfied and thus
optimized (as either minimized or maximized). In other words, CSP is about finding a
consistent assignment of values to variables[46, 47]. The DisCSP framework was a focal
point of several areas such as Artificial Intelligent and agent Technology. In DisCSP,
privacy principles have been identified at four level [47]namely: 1) The Agent, 2) The
Topology, 3) The Constraint and 4) The Decision. At the Agent level, the algorithm has
to guarantee that no agent can learn the identity of any other agent unless they are in
sharing coordination constraints. At the topology level the algorithm should not allow
any agent to learn about the constraints and cycles of other agents. For example, the
constraint of an agent for specific resource is sensitive information that should be kept
private. The Constraint level is similar to topology level with focus on constraint and its
relations. Finally at the decision level, the algorithm has to protect the outcome of any
decision that the agent makes. The solution in [47] expands the Distributed Pseudotree
Optimization Procedure (DPOP) algorithm [48] by adding privacy metrics. This
algorithm creates a Depth First Search Tree (DFS tree) out of entities. Each entity
interacts only with their neighbors. Entities send their constraint to their parent, and the
root node (leader) accordingly solves the problem and sends it back to others. The
contribution of the solution in [47] anonymizes the construction of DFS. Nodes have
code names for interactions. Moreover, the leader in each round is anonymous and given
the associated assumptions, the approach can guarantee the required privacy levels.
However, the settings in these environments are limited to the topology that is defined in
priori and the maximum distance between two nodes in the environment which is known
for the used algorithm. Evidently, the adoption of the solutions in DisCSP in CDS will
not inherent to all settings of application. Furthermore, in this algorithm, it is possible for
a malicious entity to forge the coordination information in attempt to be the leader which
may perform actions that can cause privacy concern.
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In addition, there are attempts to resolve privacy concerns in DCOP (Distributed
Constraint Optimization Problem) [49], [50]. DCOP consists of entities that set and
control the evaluation of variables. Entities decide which evaluation of the variables has
more benefit for them. However, the problem’s setting is based on the assumption that all
entities are aware of the constraints of other entities, and only the evaluation of the
variables is sensitive information [50]. Additionally, privacy solutions in DCOP are
derived from an information theoretic perspective [50] and do not necessarily reflect on
the privacy concern in setting in CDS environment

2.4 Privacy in Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Multi Agent System (MAS) is one of the computational models applied in CDS in which
the computational entities operate in a decentralized control fashion and modeled as
autonomous entities known as agents. MASs are designed for autonomous actions and
flexible interaction [51]. Agents act on behalf their principals and engage in various
interactions that might require in many cases the exchange of personal information[16].
This, as such makes privacy management an essential aspect.
Privacy management approaches in MASs have been categorized into three categories: (i)
policy-based, (ii) privacy utility tradeoff and (iii) social relationships. For instance, the
work in [30] is a policy-based framework in which a trusted broker compares the policies
of providers and consumers and decides on their compatibility. The broker resumes any
interaction only if the compared policies are compatible. However, the approach relies on
the assumption that the broker is a trusted entity[16]. The Privacy Enhancement Agent
(PEA)[52]

is

a

similar

approach

that

uses

P3P

(Platform

for

Privacy

Protection)[53]retrieve the P3P policies, validate the compatibility of policies and
accordingly decide on the possibility of further engagement in any interaction.
Other approaches adopt the ontological comparison of policies that are described and
represented using the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [54]. Once the conditions are
accepted among both parties, the consumer shares the information. In similar approaches,
the rules are semantically analyzed and the access control mechanism are incorporated
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with the privacy rules [6][7]. However, in these models, there is a lack of mechanisms
which obliged entities to comply with the commitments [16].
One of the major challenges in privacy management is to identify and measure the risk of
sharing the information. To deal with such issue, “Privacy- Utility Tradeoff”’
mechanisms were proposed[16],[5]. This work is based on calculating the information
gain of shared information. The elements such as history of two sides of interaction,
social aspects of interaction, relevancy of requested information to the offered service has
not been considered in these mechanisms. This motivated the complementary approaches
that applying concepts of trust and intimacy in measuring risk and utility. The challenge
with these approaches is the difficulty of validating these metrics, in particular in CDS
environments [16]. The utility trade off mechanisms evolved with approach of measuring
the risk of privacy concerns. The risk of interaction adheres to execution of operations
that might cause privacy concern but it can measure the probability of the entity’s data
getting used [18].

2.5 Privacy In Cooperative Distributed Systems
Many solutions are proposed for computations for which the environment is modeled as
CDS. Typically, the prospects of these models are tailored towards particular setting of
the environment where a certain type of information is exchanged in the interaction of
entities. Adopting these solutions for many applications of CDS imposes limitations and
assumption of their environments. In the following we address some of the related works
within this area.

2.5.1 Privacy in Auction Mechanisms
Auctions are subclass of markets that restrict the governing rules of the market in which
buyers and seller are trading goods and services. Auction mechanism design is the
attempt to manipulate the rules of the auction in order to achieve specific goals[55]. In
auction configurations, an auctioneer applies the rules of the auction mechanism and
rewards the winner(s). In this setting, it is possible that a faulty or malicious auctioneer
forges the auction or exploits the bidding values[56] When bidders submit their bids to
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the auctioneer, it is possible that the auctioneer exploits the bidding value of the winner
for the future auctions. For example, if the winner’s bid is $900 and the second bid value
is $600, then the auctioneer can start the auction from $900 since it has the knowledge
that at least one entity will bid with this value [56]. It is very desirable and an important
aspect of bidding activities to assure the bidders about the safety of the auction with
respect to privacy concerns.
To deal with this issue some approaches were proposed in the literature [56] ,[57]. The
work in[56] an Auction Issuer (AI) is introduced which is a passive entity that has no
direct communication with bidders and limits the auctioneer ability to only access the
relevant information. The AI in this architecture computes the auction and presents it
back to the auctioneer. This restricts the auctioneer to be able only to know the identity of
the winners only and not the value of the bids. However, this protocol cannot guarantee
the privacy of entities when collusion takes place between the AI and auctioneer. The
(AI) entity is designed to control the access of auctioneer entity to sensitive information.

2.5.2 Risk Analysis
Risk analysis in interactions of entities has played a significant role in many privacy
solutions. Identifying risk levels in a system provides meaningful measures which can be
applied to processes that could mitigate the risk [4]. Risk in general is a degree of belief
on occurrence of an event with undesired outcomes. The risk of interaction refers to level
of belief on incidents and events in which sharing information in interaction led to
privacy concerns. There are various models to capture the risk of interactions. Some of
them adhere to analyzing the interactions in terms of 1) Information Sensitivity, 2)
Information Receiver, 3) Information Usage[41] Other approaches use fuzzy logic to
capture the effecting variables on risk of interactions. The work in [58] utilizes
hierarchical fuzzy inference system to address the risk of interaction. It measures and
evaluates the relevancy of the requested information; trust level, cost and criticality of the
shared information, type of intended operation, the content of the agreement, sensitivity
of information and information gain in a given interaction. Using these variables, a
hierarchical fuzzy system can be developed to measure the risk of interaction.
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2.5.3 Targeting Advertisement
Targeting advertisement systems apply Online Behavioral Advertisement (OBA)
techniques to promote more relevant commercial contents to users. Because of capability
interdependency among entities of these systems, they need to exchange information such
as user’s interest that might be sensitive. In this context, privacy becomes a major
challenge [59] [60]. One of the approaches in addressing privacy concerns is through
Adnostic [59] In Adnostic system, privacy is modeled as a tuple that is expressed in terms
of the following attributes <consumer’s identity, consumer’s request>. The disclosure of
any relevant attribute may result in privacy concern to consumers. In this system, it was
presumed that, providers are able of delivering their capability without knowing the
identity of consumers. The objective of the model is to protect consumer’s privacy by
introducing a trusted entity called Trusted Third Party, (TTP). Providers and consumers
are defined as roles, which can be played interchangeably. A provider has to present a list
of options to the consumer whose in turn consumer selects the preferred information
which will be considered as the request information. However, consumers encrypt the list
of options including the one that was tagged as the chosen option. When providers
receive the encrypted list, they only know that an item is selected but they are now aware
which one is chosen [59]. In Adnostic, it is assumed that there is a time period where
providers have to wait before providing their capabilities. In this time, they need to
collect all encrypted lists of options sent by consumers, aggregate all these lists and
submit them back to the TTP at the end of waiting period. The TTP is capable of
decrypting the list and thus delivers the decrypted list to the provider. The provider’s
access to an aggregated list of requests does not show which identity has chosen which
item in the list. Another approach in targeting advertisement is through decoupling the
request and identity utilizing ElGamal crypto systems [60]. However, in these
approaches, the protection mechanism can be circumvented if entities collide [40].
Furthermore, the only sensitive information in this model is the combination of
consumer’s identity and their requests. This makes the system incapable of managing
various settings in CDS environments.
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2.6 Summary
Despite the variety of works carried out toward protecting privacy in different disciplines,
an adequate privacy model for CDS environment is lacking. Within the context of
information management, privacy can be categorized as information collection,
information processing, information dissemination and invasion. One of the challenges of
the privacy concept is the identification, which is referred to manipulating information in
order to retrieve and relate “sensitive information” to entities. However, information may
have different risks for the identification. Identified information can directly lead to the
risk of inferring and identifying an entity. The setting of these two categories is different,
which makes it not possible to differentiate among them.
The Law perspective on privacy and information technology provides classifications on
scenarios that can be realized in digital interactions. These scenarios are instances of the
privacy concerns that could happen in CDS environments. Furthermore, privacy has been
evaluated in many research subjects such as authorization mechanisms, publishing data
sources, Multi Agent Systems, Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem, auction
mechanisms, risk assessment and targeting advertisements. The authorization
mechanisms tend to address access control issues, while attending to how information is
used and manipulated is neglected. Most of privacy models in publishing data sources
address the issues of publishing aggregated information by a trusted entity. This setting is
not necessarily applicable in all applications of CDS environments. Solutions in MAS
need to make entities comply with what they commit. They also need to consider the
social aspects of the relationships between entities. Realizing such setting in CDS may
not be feasible. Evaluating risks of interactions to address privacy was pursued in
different privacy models. Nonetheless, to our knowledge, none of the existing privacy
solutions have provided a privacy model that is adequate for CDS environments.
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Chapter 3

3

Privacy Concerns in CDS: Concepts and Model

Privacy is the interest of immense area of research for which many models have been
proposed that are automated in different applications. Some of the applied models require
settings where impose limitations on the design of the entities of the environment and
create a closed environment. This necessitates employing privacy models that can capture
privacy as a computational concept for which formal analysis of privacy becomes
essential. Treating privacy in information management context enables modeling privacy
in a computation context where the flow of sensitive information becomes a concern for
privacy. Our contribution in this chapter includes the formal analysis of privacy and
modeling it in the context of information management.

3.1 CDS: Description and Agent-based Model
CDS are a class of systems in which entities are autonomous, self-interested, able to
operate on some functions locally, and exercise some authority in sharing their
capabilities. Goals in these settings refer to a state in which the actions of the entity,
including physical and mental reasoning, are directed at the said state. Within CDS,
entities have interdependencies through which some goals might be unattainable through
the abilities of an individual entity. They may require coordinating activities with other
entities to reach to an individual or collective goal state [19], [51]. This coordination is a
class of solutions that provides structure and mechanisms to the system to deal with
interdependency problems. “Structure” refers to the entities’ pattern of communication
and decision-making related to coordination. “Mechanisms” are a composition of
decision points, coordinated control and interaction devices directed to resolve problems
with interdependencies [19]. An essential characteristic of CDS is the distribution of
control; this means that the strategies of entities cannot be controlled by outside parties.
This supports the fact that every entity in CDS has a part of the solution in which
participating entities’ goals are achieved.
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Figure 1. Computation Entity in CDS
In this work, we concentrate on entities of CDS in an Agent-Based model in which
entities can be modeled as CIR agents. These Agents are organized by knowledge,
problem solving, interaction, and communication capabilities [19]. “Knowledge” is the
entity’s mental state about the world, which is incomplete in many examples of CDS
environment and the global knowledge is distributed among all entities. “Problem
solving” refers to the entity’s ability to identify the class of their goals, categorizing sub
goals, applying required actions to the goals’ state, and determining the type of
interdependency. “Interaction” is the authority and capability of the entity in the pursuit
of mechanisms that can resolve interdependency problems. Interaction mechanisms are
steered by protocols that manage engagement between entities. The “communication”
layer is responsible for packaging and transferring messages in the desired languages.
[19] Communication-based interaction, or message-based Interaction, is essential when
the entities’ knowledge is incomplete and they are obligated to exchange messages. The
connections between various aspects in computation entities are shown in Figure 1. Due
to interdependency problems regarding settings in CDS, reaching a solution requires the
interaction of multiple autonomous entities. This indicates that computation in CDS takes
place within interactions among entities.
In the open structure of CDS environments, entities’ availability and participation is
unpredictable and there is no control on their behavior or the design that they adopt. The
new form of computation emerging in Grid, cloud, and mobile computing can be
modeled as open CDS. Cloud paradigms such as IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS have served many
application domains such as medical, health, financial, entertainments, education,
business, and communication.
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3.2 Privacy Model and Analysis
Privacy is the concern of environments with multiple autonomous entities. Autonomy of
entities facilitates them to exploit the information they receive in various ways.
Consequently, this might reflect privacy of other entities. Considering a single entity in
an environment, there will not be any privacy challenges. It technically is the natural
characteristic of the environments that autonomous entities exchange information. Let 𝑊
be the decentralized environment of autonomous self-interested entities.
W = {e1 , … , eN }
In the context of information management, entities include information and operations. In
the lowest granularity level, an entity can be shown as:
ei =< Oi , Ii > , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁, 𝑖: 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟
Where:
Ii ≡ {Ii,1 , … , Ii,k , … , Ii,M } ,
1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ M, i: entities′ identifier, k: information identifier
and
Oi ≡ {oi,1 , … , oi,w , … , oi,W } ,
1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ w ≤ W, i: entities ′ identifier, w: operation identifier
Privacy is in direct relation with self-realization of an entity, which reflects the objectives
of the entity in a given environment [29]. In any situation that an entity has to be
protected with respect to privacy, there is sensitive information that the entity doesn’t
prefer reveal and expose. Entities have various states. As an example, in an object
oriented modeling, the entity might have different attributes in which each represents a
state of an entity. Information is a tool for modeling the state of an entity. Therefore, the
entity in relation with others desires to protect the sensitive states from being exposed to
the outside world. Privacy also can be defined at the level of units. Family is the example
of units in societies in which people have distinctive approaches in the flow of
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information to the outside of the unit. In result, for any given state of an entity, there is a
boundary for exposure. This suggests that Privacy is the state of exposure boundary of an
entity’s state with the outside world. For any information, there exists an exposure
boundary including the entities that are considered to be inside the boundary. This is
denoted as Ei,k as the following:
Ei,k = {et+1 , … , et+r } , ⊂ (Ei,k , W), 1 ≤ r, t ≤ N
Existing of boundary emphasizes on the flow of information within the boundary and
preventing it from outside. This can describe the sensitive information as well.
Information might be sensitive in relation with a particular entity and it might be nonsensitive with others. When the information flows within the boundary it is non-sensitive
but existing of the information outside of exposure boundary makes it sensitive
information. For instance, salary information is not sensitive to be shared with members
of a family but it is when sharing it with a colleague. The exposure boundary is
designated by the entity. Therefore, sensitive information is a relative concept reflecting
the reluctance of an entity in sharing information with a particular entity.
IS (Ii,k , ej ) ≡∉ (ej , Ei,k )

1.

Information exists in explicit form. It is the definite form of information. As previously
described, information can be classified as sensitive and non-sensitive in relation with the
entity being interacted with. It can also be classified as implicit information in relation to
the operations that can be applied on the explicit information. Implicit information can be
transformed to explicit information by execution of the operation.
The operation can be modeled as a function that extracts implicit information from
explicit information and consequently transforms it to an explicit form. It also can
combine the explicit information with other auxiliary information (denoted as Iaux ) to
transform the implicit information to explicit. The auxiliary information is collected or
inferred information, which does not reflect any information by its own but it can expose
information about an entity if it is used in combination with other information. This
information can be an empty set of information as well, when the operation only needs
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the given explicit information. Therefore, any implicit information is equivalent to some
explicit information that can be defined as follows:
o(Ix1 , Iaux ) ≡ Ix2

2.

Manipulation of explicit information by applying of operations can transform the implicit
information into explicit form. In the above example,
o̿(Ix1 , Iaux , Ix2 ) 3.
illustrates that Executing Operation (o) on explicit information Ix1 to transform the
implicit information to explicit form of Ix2 . In contrary
̃
o̿(Ix1
, Iaux ) 4.
is used to show the execution of an operation is prevented or neutralized. Thus, the
application of the operation cannot proceed.
One of the means of the flow of the information is through sharing information with
other entities. Entities can decide if a particular entity belongs to the exposure boundary
of certain information. When the entity is outside of the boundary, the information is
considered sensitive and hence entities do not share. Therefore sharing is defined as a
process that takes place only within the exposure boundary and can be formally
expressed as:
S(Ii,k , ej ) ≡ ¬IS (Ii,k , ej ) ∧ [= (Ij ,∪ (Ii,k , Ij ))] 5.
Although entities has the authority on protecting their relevant explicit sensitive
information by not sharing it with others outside of the boundary, it becomes a concern
when the implicit information might be transformed into explicit sensitive information.
For instance, John’s salary is classified as sensitive information. For example, John
shares with Amy information, which states that his salary is 10 percent more than the
average salary of the employees. If Amy has an operation that is capable of retrieving the
employees average salary, she will be able to extract John’s salary. In this example, the
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statement “John’s salary is 10 percent above the employee’s salary” is explicit
information, while Amy’s operations and this information implicitly refer to John’s salary
which is considered being sensitive. This illustrates how implicit information may convey
sensitive information and by transform it into explicit information will reveal the explicit
sensitive information.
The presence of operations on the entity that receives the information results in
possessing the implicit information.
D(Ii,k , ej ) ≡
W

[= (Ij , (∪ (II,k , ⋃

( Ij , oj,w (II,k )), Ij )))]

w=1

6.
By sharing non-sensitive explicit information, it is possible to disclose implicit
information. The implicit information can be labeled as being sensitive or non-sensitive.
This indicates that the disclosure of information might result in transferring the
information to the outside of its exposure boundary. In other words, privacy concern
relates to disclosure of sensitive implicit information.
Security mechanisms can provide the necessary control on the sharing process in which is
applied at the exposure boundary. However, because the disclosure of sensitive implicit
information can transfer the information outside of the exposure boundary, security
mechanisms are not sufficient for managing privacy concerns.
In the previous example, Ijohn,k is representing the statement “Jon’s salary is 10 percent
employee average salary”. Amy also belongs to Ejohn,k where implies ¬IS (Ijohn,k , eAmy ).
If Amy has a retrieval operation (oAmy,ret ) on a statistical dataset that includes the
employee average salary Iaux and calculates john’s salary, oAmy,ret (Ijohn,k , Iaux ) is the
implicit information that reflects John’s salary (Ijohn,k′ ).
𝑜̿Amy,ret (Ijohn,k , Iaux , Ijohn,k′ )
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This suggests that if Amy executes oAmy,ret (Ijohn,k , Iaux ) , she can extract John’s salary.
Disseminating information ultimately can be modeled by operations where the
functionality of the operation is to transfer the information to other entities. As an
example, Amy may perform an operation to send Ijohn,k to Adam.
In another setting, let ei and ej be the entities interacting. Originally ei has Ii,info1 and Ii,2
where Ii,info2 is sensitive to share and Ii,info1 is non-sensitive.
IS (Ii,info2 , ej )
¬IS (Ii,info1 , ej )
However, ej has operations in which can extract Ii,info2 from Ii,info1 .
o(Ii,info1 , Iaux ) ≡ Ii,info2
o̿(Ii,info1 , Iaux , Ii,info2 )
One of the main challenges of privacy relates to execution of operations that converts the
sensitive implicit information to explicit form. Hence, having the knowledge about
operations of the entity that receives the information can indicate what sensitive
information can be retrieved by sharing of particular information. This introduces the
concept of authorized operations. Oi,k
j is a set of operations belonging to Oj where ei has
agreed on their application on Ii,k .

3.2.1 Privacy Concepts
Modeling privacy as a computational concept requires identifying measures that can
reflect privacy in a computational model. In this section, we elaborate on the concepts
that explain the state of privacy among interacting entities. These concepts have been
applied for managing measures that can be associated to computational concepts.
When entities share information, they agree on the terms of utilization of the shared
information. As an example, this can be enforced through the norms of various cultures in
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people societies [25] or electronic legal agreements among web services[61] Ideally,
these agreements include the allowed set of operations that can be applied on the shared
information. Dishonoring a given agreement by the execution of non-authorized
̂ i,k
operations O
is considered to be an evidence of privacy violation. For instance in the
j
above example, if ej execute a non-authorized operation o , then it is said that ej has
violated the privacy of ei . Similarly, if Amy applies the retrieval operation when it is not
in the agreement with John, Amy has violated John’s privacy. Accordingly:
i,k
̂ i,k
−(O
j , Oj , Oj )

where:
−(θ, M, X) ≡ ∀ x ∋ (x, θ) | ∋ (x, M) ∧ ∉ (x, X)
̂ i,k
O
̂ i,k
̂ i,k
oi,k
j ≡ {o
j,1 , … , o
j,t , … ,̂
j,T } , 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇
The unauthorized operations also can be defined in relation with all of information about
an entity.
M

̂ ij
O

̂ i,k
= ⋃(∅, O
j )
k=1

Based on the scope of communicated information through sharing and disclosure, the
unauthorized operations can be applied on a subset of information (𝑆) as well.
̂ ij (S) =
O

⋃

̂ sj )
(∅, O

∀s,∈(s,PS(S))

Non-authorized characteristics of an operation relates to the interacting entity. They can
̂ i,k
agree on the set of un-allowed. Let ↓ O
j,w the notation to address the negative permission
over execution of an operation tagged as non-authorized. Entities agree on set of
operations that cannot be executed over the shared information. This is considered to be
the agreement between entity 𝑒𝑖 and 𝑒𝑗 while sharing Ii,k .
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θi,k
̂ i,k
i,j ≡ ∀w | ↓ o
j,w
Given this, privacy violation of 𝑒𝑖 by 𝑒𝑗 is through disobeying the agreement θi,j between
ei and ej by executing non authorized operations oj,w on Ii,k :
i,k
i,k
̿̂ i,k (Ii,k )]
̂ i,k
PV(ej , Ii,k , O
j , θi,j ) ≡ ∃ w| θi,j ∧ [o
j,w

7.

While the privacy violation is about disobeying the agreement among entities, privacy
protection is enforcing mechanism that prevents application of non-authorized operations
on entities information. In the proposed model, any sets of information also are
considered as information. Hence, the privacy protection is about preventing execution of
non-authorized operations on all subsets of information.
t
̂ j ) ≡ ∀ t , w| ⊂ (t, PS(Ii )) ∧ o̿̂̃
PP(ej , (PS(Ii )), O
j,w (t) 8.

PS(S) ≡ S ′ | ∀p , ∈ (p, S ′ ) ∧ ⊂ (p, S) ∧ (∄p′ | ⊂ (p′ , S) ∧⊄ (p′ , S ′ ))
Sharing information in CDS happens among entities during the interaction. In many
cases, a privacy concern is geared to negative impacts on the owner of information. In
this work, we have modeled the negative impact that might be resulted by privacy
concern as the cost of interaction. It could be modeled by the negative utility that an
entity perceives by exploitation of the information. For example, within the healthcare
domain, various sensors and devices that are typically planted or embedded in the
patient’s body can provide different types of patient’s information. If the gathered
information is disclosed to the public because of a sharing process, a high risk of loosing
job opportunities or insurance plans might be envisaged. Such a scenario reflects the cost
of exploiting and sharing the sensors’ information. Cost can be modeled by the
perception of an entity about the negative impact that will be imposed by exploiting the
shared information with a specific recipient.
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C(Ii,k , ej ) → R+
However, in the context of incomplete knowledge, the model can be extended to
capturing the risk of occurrence of such event. In the above example, the cost of losing
insurance because of sharing medical information might be significant for many patients.
However, such incidents rarely happen and the risk of it might not be high.
aux
R(Ii,k , ej ) = P (o̿̂ i,k
)) × C(Ii,k , ej ))
j,w (Ii,k , I

3.2.2 Differential Privacy In Privacy Information Management

Model
In this section, we position our findings in relation to Differential Privacy. We reduce the
proposed formal privacy model to this model and illustrate that concepts of the model can
be mapped to the proposed one.
Differential privacy is a model for creating randomized function that has been applied in
various statistical databases including anonymized datasets. The setting in differential
privacy includes an info collector 𝑒𝑖 that provides aggregated information by gathering
information from individuals. There are participants 𝑒𝑘 that provide their information to
the info collector and expect their information to stay private. Also, there are adversaries
𝑒𝑗 that apply some operations on previous explicit information and others received to
extend implicit sensitive information about participants. The objective of this model is to
reduce the risk of disclosing individuals’ information as the result of their participation in
information collection process [23].
Info collector provides a set of operations [in the form of queries (𝑄)] that can be
executed upon various entities including adversaries. An adversary already possesses
auxiliary explicit information that the info collector is not aware of and utilization of this
information results in privacy concern [23].
Modeling the setting of differential privacy using our proposed framework is as the
following:
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The world has at least three entities representing info collector, adversary and participant:
𝑊 = {𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 , 𝑒𝑘 }
𝑒𝑖 =< 𝐼𝑖 , 𝑂𝑖 >
𝑒𝑗 =< 𝐼𝑗 , 𝑂𝑗 >
𝑒𝑘 =< 𝐼𝑘 , 𝑂𝑘 >
Participants share some information with info collector which is sensitive to share with
another entity.
S(I𝑘,l , e𝑖 ) → ¬IS (I𝑘,l , e𝑖 )
¬S(I𝑘,l , e𝑗 ) → IS (I𝑘,l , e𝑗 )
There is some auxiliary information about participants that is possessed by the adversary.
It can be explicitly received or implicitly inferred.
D(Ik,p , ej ) → ∈ (Ik,p , 𝐼𝑗 )
Equivalently, the information set of each entity is as the following:
Ii = {D, DB, Ik,l }
Ik = {Ik,l , Ik,p }
Ij = {Ik,p }
Assuming, there are queries oi,m at info collector ei that can transform Ik,l into new
explicit information such as Ii,b . Similarly, there is an operation at adversary that utilizes
Ii,b to regenerate Ik,p :
∈ (oi,m , Oi )
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∈ (oj,n , Oj )
oi,m ({Ik,l , D, DB}) ≡ Ii,b
oj,n ({Ik,p , Ii,b }) ≡ Ik,l
k,p

Then application of ôj,n is not authorized and neglecting it inherently becomes the
evidence of privacy concern.
k,p
o̿̂ j,n ({Ik,p , Ii,b })

The info collector applies a mechanism [differential privacy] to prevent the execution of
oj,n . Differential privacy mechanism enables the info collector to include noise
information to the result of each query. The outcome is new information that cannot be
used for retrieving Ik,l .
k,p

PP: oi,m′ |𝑜̿𝑖,𝑚′ ({Ik,l , D, DB, Ii,b }) = Ii,b′ ∧ o̿̂ j,n ({Ik,p , Ii,b′ })! = Ik,l
In above, we demonstrated the setting of differential privacy as privacy protection model
using the proposed framework. In this section, we elaborate on concepts of differential
privacy model and present a comparison between the proposed model and differential
privacy.
Differential privacy is a quasi-protection mechanism which has been developed using the
preventive manipulative approach in the context of statistical databases. This model has
defined privacy as a goal to reducing the risk of entity being denied in a situation as the
result of participating in a statistical database [23]. Based on this, privacy violation
equivalently has been addressed by privacy breach concept. This concepts is the state of a
Turing machine c in which is not halted if the adversary finds the correct s in a given
database DB and its distribution D:
Privacy Breach ≡ the adversary generates S where C(D, DB, S)accepts
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The adversary is an entity that makes efforts in generating proper S to make C not halted.
This definition implies that privacy concern is a function of the “explicit information”
learned from the database.
Utilizing the differentially private randomizing functions is motivated by modeling
privacy protection at participation of entities. In the other word, privacy protection is the
state of producing outputs [explicit information] in which participation of any single
entity does not impact the result in a huge extend. This argues that “participation of an
entity in a statistical database” is the information that privacy protection is targeting. This
suggests that “participation” is considered to be sensitive information.
Sensitivity is in direct relation with the perception of an entity about the recipients of
information [41]. However, the above analysis illustrates that there is an assumption in
differential privacy in which only considers the “ownership” of information as sensitive
information. This is the reason that they capture sensitivity at the operation level. The
result of all operations will be incorporated with levels of noise which can satisfy the
conditions of differentially private functions. This has been captured using L1 −
Sensitivity measure. For given datasets D1 and D2 differing only in one element and a
query function [operation] f, L1 − Sensitivity has been defined as:
∆f =

Max
D1 ,D2 (||f(D1 )

− f(D2 )||1 )

The mechanism in differential privacy adds noises to the result of queries to protect
privacy of participants. The variance of the added noise is denoted as σ. To realize the
conditions of ϵ − Differential Privacy, σ has to be greater than

ϵ
∆f

. All queries received

by the info collector are examined through the above condition and the necessary noise is
added to the result [62].
The above assumption limits the capabilities of the model to process more complicated
scenarios. As an example, John eJohn is a patient that suffers from a severe disease and he
is under trial of a new research to find a cure for the disease. Let the disease be Ψ. John’s
medical information has been shared with a medical statistical database esdb to assist
researchers with finding a cure. Also, some information such as the region Υ John comes
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from is collected. This helps researchers to perform history analysis on their patients.
After running experiments osdb,cure on patients, they realize that there is 90 percent
correlation between high cholesterol level Κ and affected by Ψ. As information is shared
with the statistical database, they are not considered to be sensitive. However, when an
insurance company eins investigates various patients, some information becomes
sensitive.
In information management, sets and subsets of information are considered to be
information as well. Therefore, in relation with esdb :
¬IS (IJohn,k , esdb ),
¬IS (IJohn,Ψ , esdb ),
¬IS (IJohn,Υ , esdb ),
𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,𝑂Ψ = {Owner(eJohn , IJohn,Ψ )}
¬IS (𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,𝑂Ψ , esdb ) ,
𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,𝑂Κ = {Owner(eJohn , IJohn,k )}
¬IS (𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,𝑂k , esdb )
𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,ΨΚ = {IJohn,Ψ , IJohn,k },
¬IS (𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,ΨΚ , esdb )
And in relation with eins
¬IS (IJohn,k , eins ),
¬IS (IJohn,Ψ , eins ),
IS (𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,𝑂Ψ , eins ) ,
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IS (𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,𝑂k , eins )
The region information as a single information is not sensitive with sharing with eins .
¬IS (IJohn,Υ , eins )
In result of a scientific research, the correlation of Κ and Ψ also is not sensitive:
¬IS (𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,ΨΚ , eins )
Applying differential privacy can limit the disclosure of 𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,𝑂Ψ and 𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,𝑂k to other
entities including eins .
However, another processing operation osdb,reg in esdb is applied on information to
evaluate the correlation of regions and the disease. The outcome may conclude that 99
percent of people having Ψ are coming from Υ. Although Υ is not considered being
sensitive, the combination of the disease and the region becomes sensitive.
𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,ΥΨ = {IJohn,Υ , IJohn,Ψ }
IS (𝐼𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛,ΥΨ , eins )
Regardless of John’s interests in participating with the statistical database towards
achieving a treatment for Ψ, he does not agree on participating in osdb,reg (though it may
have a low L1-sensitivity measure). The mechanism in differential privacy does not
provide the autonomy for entities to evaluate if the existing operations are authorized to
be applied on their information.
Lack of sensitivity concept at the information level makes differential privacy fail in
various scenarios in the setting of statistical databases. This model has motivated several
privacy models and privacy mechanism designs such as [63], [32], [64]. Similar to
differential privacy, any model that can be reduced at information management can be
explained and abstracted by the proposed framework in which supports diverse settings
of privacy among entities.
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3.3 CDS: Adequate privacy model
The analysis within our research indicates that among the existing privacy models,
attending to settings that can be adequate for CDS environments is lacking. The privacy
model in CDS has to be captured at the computation and therefore, it requires formal
modeling of privacy. We claim that the proposed privacy model that we presented in
chapter 5 is associable and applicable in CDS environment as computation platforms.
The proposed formal privacy model is in the context of information management where
entities are modeled as set of information and operations. Information management is
categorized as information collection, processing and dissemination.
CDS is a class of systems that is positioned as a computation platform in which
computation happens at the interactions of entities. Solutions in CDS are achieved by
participation of entities in a distributed decentralized fashion. They require resolving the
interdependency problem through coordinating their activities for which they adopt
interaction mechanisms.
In incomplete knowledge world, entities’ knowledge about the world is incomplete for
which entities update their knowledge about the world and solve their problems through
message-based interactions.
DEFINITION 1: A computation system including entities 𝐸 provides a solution (𝑆) to a
problem (𝑃) by applying computation processes (𝐶𝑝).
𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝑃 × 𝐶𝑝 → 𝑆
DEFINITION 2: 𝐶 is Information Management computation system (𝑖 − 𝑚𝑛𝑔) when
problem and solution are modeled as information and computation as operation.
Operations in information management can be classified as collection, processing and
dissemination that can be executed by entities 𝐸. If the problem is modeled as
information I:
∀ 𝑖, ∈ (𝑖, 𝑃) ∧ ∃ 𝑠 , ∈ (𝑠, 𝑆) ∧ ∃ 𝑜 ∈ (𝑜, 𝑂𝑗 ) ∧∋ (𝑒𝑗 , 𝐸)| = ( 𝑜(𝑖), 𝑠) → 𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝐼 × 𝑂 → 𝑆
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DEFINITION 3: 𝑆 is acceptable solution (𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡(𝑠)) is it resolves the problem and
does not result in privacy concern.
DEFINITION 4: Privacy Model in the context of sensitive information (𝑃 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) is
𝑘≤𝑀

𝑃: {𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 } × 𝐼𝑖 × 𝑂𝑗 → ⋃ ¬𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )
𝑘=1

THEOREM 1: Let 𝑃 be a (𝑃 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙). For any (𝑖 − 𝑚𝑛𝑔), P is essential to have
(𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡).
𝑠
(𝑃 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙): {𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 } × 𝐼𝑖 × 𝑂𝑗 → ⋃𝑘≤𝑀
𝑘=1 ¬𝐼 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )

(𝑖 − 𝑚𝑛𝑔): 𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝐼 × 𝑂 → 𝑆
𝑘≤𝑀

∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 | 𝑄 ≡ ⋃ ¬𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )
𝑘=1

𝑖𝑓 ∃ 𝑠, ∈ (𝑠, 𝑆)| ∉ (𝑠, 𝑄) → ¬(𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡(𝑠))
Therefore, the acceptable solution in (𝑖 − 𝑚𝑛𝑔) has to include the (𝑃 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙).
THEOREM 2: Any incomplete knowledge CDS computation is an (𝑖 − 𝑚𝑛𝑔)
The computation in incomplete knowledge CDS happens in interactions therefore:
𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝐼𝑛 → 𝑆
Because in incomplete knowledge CDS, knowledge in modeled as information,
interaction is modeled as information collection, processing and dissemination which can
be abstracted as Operation and information. Hence:
𝐼𝑛 ≡ < 𝐼, 𝑂 >
𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝐼𝑛 → 𝑆
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𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝐼, 𝑂 → 𝑆
Therefore, computation in incomplete knowledge CDS can be modeled as information
management computation, which based on THEOREM 1 affirms the proposed privacy
model is applicable and required to achieve acceptable solutions.

3.4 Summary
Privacy can adequately be addressed in the context of information management where the
information is collected, processed and disseminated. Entities tend to protect their
sensitive information by not sharing it with other entities. Sensitivity is a relative concept
that may change from a receiver to another. For any information, there exists an exposure
boundary that includes entities that the flow of information within the boundary is not a
concern. However, transferring information to outside of the boundary through operations
makes the information sensitive and cause privacy concern. The information can be
classified as explicit and implicit. The latter one is the conjunction of explicit information
and operations. The privacy concern is related to the transformation of the explicit
information to sensitive information by applying operations. Such operations become noauthorized operations. If there is an agreement between the entities on not executing the
non authorized operations, and still the operation is executed, privacy has been violated.
In addition, if an operation is applied that prevents or neutralizes the application of
information, it is referred as privacy protection. Many privacy models can be modeled
through the proposed privacy model and it is illustrated that there are sensitive
information that may not be protected within those models. Furthermore, it is formally
argued that the privacy model at information management context can adequately address
privacy in CDS environments.
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Chapter 4

4

Privacy Protection Management Framework

The computation in CDS happens at interaction level where entities exchange
information at which information management becomes an adequate context to model
privacy for CDS. Additionally, the message-based interactions in CDS can be modeled
with information management into information collection, processing and dissemination.
Modeling privacy in information management capacitates application of the model in
interactions through which privacy becomes part of the computation. The interactions are
steered by interaction protocols that are abstracted as set of messages and sequences. By
incorporating the privacy model at the interaction, it creates a privacy protection
management framework that can expand on interaction protocol messages and sequences
that are supported by privacy protection mechanisms.

4.1 Our Contribution
Interaction-Based Privacy Protection Management Framework: In this work we have
proposed an interaction-based privacy protection framework that includes the formal
analysis of capturing the privacy requirements in interaction of entities as well as
applying adequate privacy protection mechanisms. As the computation in CDS happens
at interaction, the proposed expands the interaction protocol with privacy protection
mechanisms. The proposed framework is an architectural based solution for privacy and
is defined at the interaction level. This enables the framework to be adopted by various
applications and computational solutions.
Analytical Tool for elaborating privacy as a state in a computational system: The
proposed privacy model and the privacy protection management framework provide the
necessary tools to evaluate the state of privacy in different systems by processing on the
interaction protocol that is applied. We have used this framework to identify the privacy
concerns at Contract Net protocol that is discussed in more details in Chapter 6.
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Capturing privacy as a computation concept. By applying the privacy protection
management framework at computation level, the privacy protection management
becomes an architectural element of a computation entity as well as a new parameter
essential for computation solution functions. The details of implementing this framework
at computation entity are provided in Chapter 5.
Privacy-Based Interaction Protocol. The proposed privacy protection management
framework expands the given interaction protocol with adequate privacy protection
mechanisms which can provide sufficient privacy protection for entities in CDS.
Quantifiable Privacy Protection Level for the privacy based interaction protocol.
The proposed privacy protection framework conducts analysis on measuring the privacy
protection level of protection mechanisms that leads to measuring the protection level of
the provided privacy based interaction protocol.

4.2 Privacy Protection in Incomplete Knowledge in CDS
In order to manage privacy protection, privacy protection mechanisms require knowing
the operations of entities and being aware of what operations are authorized. In various
instances of CDS environments, knowledge of entities is incomplete. This implies
uncertainty about operations of entities. Capturing uncertainty provides levels of
knowledge about the operations. This affirms the exercise of quasi protection
mechanisms in varied precedent of CDS environments.
Quasi protection mechanisms convey levels of uncertainty about the extent of
unauthorized operations that the mechanism can prevent from execution. For instance
anonymization techniques can provide privacy protection with a degree of probability
[23], [65]. Others such as rule based mechanisms for protecting privacy are capable of
supporting a limited number of non-authorized operations [9], [42]. The uncertainty level
in these cases has been captured as Privacy Protection Level (PPL). In the other word,
PPL is a probabilistic base model to describe the effectiveness of a mechanism to prevent
or neutralize unauthorized operations from producing sensitive information. This measure
can be associated to computational concepts. The execution of the mechanism 𝜇 in
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relation to protecting privacy is the space 𝑆 that the mechanism can prevent the execution
of non-authorized operation:
𝜇̿ ≡ 𝑃𝑃 (𝑒𝑗 , 𝑆, 𝑂̂𝑗𝑖 (𝑆))
By applying the mechanism over the space of entities’ information set, there is
uncertainty level associated to the application of the protection mechanism which implies
the conditional probability protecting privacy by executing 𝜇 given the space of 𝐼𝑖 . In
another word, we measure the probability of 𝜇 protecting privacy when it is applied on 𝐼𝑖 .
𝑃𝑃𝐿(𝑒𝑗 , 𝐼𝑖 , 𝜇𝑡 ) = 𝑃( 𝜇̿ | 𝐼𝑖 )

9.

This can be measured either statistically or characteristically. For instance, in a simplified
view, in a complete knowledge world where entities have the knowledge over all
communicated information, in discrete set of operations and an algebraic form,
evaluating PPL depends on non-authorized operations that is prevented from application
by applying the mechanism 𝑧 to all of non-authorized operations n; PPL =

𝑧
n

.

PPL is a measure that predicts privacy protection in an interaction among two entities.
Evidently, if the mechanism can provide outputs where(𝑧 = 𝑛), perfect privacy
protection is achieved.
Depending on the context and architecture of the environment, PPL might be evaluated
differently using the same approach. As an example, in this section, we evaluate the PPL
of differential privacy [23]. A randomized function 𝐾 is ϵ − differentially private if for
all datasets D2 and D1 differing on at most one element and all S ⊆ Range(K), Pr[K(D1 ) ∈
S ] ≤ exp(ϵ) × Pr[K(D2 ) ∈ S][23].
To achieve differential privacy, a mechanism is required that can implement differential
privacy [66], [63]. The probability of a mechanism implementing differential privacy is
1 − 2𝜖 [63].
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Considering 𝑛 as number of non-authorized operations [queries] in info collector,
implementing 𝜖 − 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦 in z number of non-authorized operations has
1 − 2𝜖 probability in each of them. Therefore, it creates a binomial distribution in which
the expected value of z∶ 𝐸(𝑧) = 𝑛(1 − 2𝜖). This leads to 𝑃𝑃𝐿 = 1 − 2𝜖.

4.3 Privacy protection mechanism
As described in previous sections, privacy protection mechanisms apply on operations
that prevent or neutralize non-authorized operations. Privacy protection mechanisms in
both forms of perfect or quasi can effect in two dimensions. Either they can work at the
operation level to identify the non-authorized operations such as rule based authorization
engines or they can apply at the information level to neutralize the execution of nonauthorized operations such as distorting the information as results of operations.
Privacy protection mechanisms are operations that are applied on information and
provide the necessary information for privacy protection. This indicates that the structure
of privacy protection mechanism is the set of operations it applies

𝑂𝜇 and set of

information generated by the operations 𝐼𝜇 .
𝜇 =< 𝑂𝜇 , 𝐼𝜇 > 10.
𝑂𝜇 = {𝑜𝑚,1 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝐷 } , 1 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝐷
Privacy protection mechanism also can be categorized as preventive and punishing.
When the mechanism operations is applied before sharing information, it is preventive
and when it is practiced after non-authorized operations are executed, they become
punishing mechanisms.
Preventive mechanisms at the information level refer to protection mechanisms that are
running in a sequence to provide sufficient information for the requested service or task
in addition to not disclosing the sensitive information. In this context, there exist at least
two entities that one of them owns the information 𝑒𝑖 . The other entity 𝑒𝑗 is collecting
information 𝑖 to perform a service or a task. Therefore, the information 𝑖 has to be shared
with the collecting entity.
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S(I𝑖,k , e𝑗 )
Applying the protection mechanism at preventive at information level would be as the
following:
∀ 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 ∈ 𝑂𝜇 | 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡(𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝑑 (I𝑖,k ), 𝐼𝜇 )
′

′

𝑜̿ 𝑚,1 (I𝑖,k ) = I𝑖,k′ ∧ (∄𝑜𝑚,𝑑 ∈ 𝑂𝜇 |𝑜𝑚,1 ≡ 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 )

𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷 (𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−1 (𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−2 (I𝑖,k ) (𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−3 (I𝑖,k ) (… (𝑜̿ 𝑚,1 (I𝑖,k )))))) = 𝐼𝜇 11.

∧ (∄𝑜𝑚,𝑑" ∈ 𝑂𝜇 |𝑜𝑚,𝐷 ≡ 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 )
Every operation in the mechanism provides the information for another operation in the
mechanism. These operations also will be executed in a specific pattern of sequence. The
examples of these mechanisms are anonymization techniques [23], [43], [13], [12] or
encryption methodologies [56], [59], [60] applied for privacy protection.
Similarly, preventive privacy protection mechanism at the operation level includes
operations that are performed in a specified order. Executing these operations does not
allow the non-authorized operations retrieve any result.
𝜇
̂ 𝑖,𝑘
∀ 𝑡 |𝑜
𝑗,𝑡 (I𝑖,k ) ≡ I𝑖,k′ ∧ I𝑖,k′ ∉ 𝐼

Operations in this type of protection mechanisms require being aware what operation is
going to be applied on information. They either are not authorized and therefore, do not
get results or the result will be provided for them.

𝑜̿

𝑚,𝐷

({𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑜̿

𝑚,𝐷−1

({𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑜̿

𝑚,𝐷−2

({𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , … , 𝑜̿

𝑚,1

12.

∅

(𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , I𝑖,k )})})}) = {
I𝑖,k"

𝑖𝑓 ∈ (𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑂̂𝑗𝑖 )
𝑖𝑓 ∉ (𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑂̂𝑗𝑖 )
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The punishing approach in privacy protection mechanism is applied in situations where
the prevention of sharing information is not possible. However, some operations can
provide assurances to the owner of information. Whenever a collecting entity violates
their privacy requirements, the owner of the information can exercise some degree of
authority in executing the punishing operations accordingly. The example of this
approach is the terms and conditions that are accepted by both entities. If any operation
outside of the agreement is executed, there will be legal consequences for the noncompliant entity. The generated information in this mechanism is shared with the entity
that has executed the non-authorized operations.
m,D ({𝑜
m,D−1 ({𝑜
m,D−2 (𝑜
m,1 ̂ 𝑖,𝑘 )})})}) ≡ 𝐼𝜇 13.
̿̿̿̿̿̿
̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿
̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿
̿̿̿̿̿̿
̂ 𝑖,𝑘
̂ 𝑖,𝑘
̂ 𝑖,𝑘
̂ 𝑖,𝑘
∀ 𝑡, 𝑜
𝑗,𝑡 | o
𝑗,𝑡 , o
𝑗,𝑡 , o
𝑗,𝑡 , … , o (𝑜
𝑗,𝑡

The classification of protection mechanism are depicted in Figure 2.
When preventive mechanism cannot be applied, the punishing mechanism will be more
adequate. For instance, when a service provider interacts with a consumer in different
time periods, the information that are aggregated in this period can be used to transform
sensitive implicit information to explicit using an auxiliary information. To avoid this,
punishing mechanism will be more effective. Naturally, punishing mechanisms support
agreements among two entities in which enforce the execution of consecutive actions
towards the faulty entity.
Protection mechanism can be applied at information and operation levels. Typically
protection mechanisms at the information level limit the access of entities to the
information that is shared. As an example anonymization and encryption distort the
information for which is sufficient for resolving the requested task and does not disclose
the sensitive information. This might be inadequate in relation with applications that
require receiving the non-distorted complete information. To deal with this the protection
mechanisms at the operation level are more advantageous.
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Figure 2. Classification of protection mechanisms

4.4

Privacy Protection Management Framework

Typically, entities have various expectations and preferences over privacy that by itself
changes in different contexts and in different times. This is the reason that makes rulebased protection mechanism not convenient for CDS environments. These approaches are
well established where the social and technological developments are in a stable state [10,
40] . In contrary of rule based approaches, there are standard based approaches that are
commonly applied at the architecture level. One of the instances of standard based
approaches is PII 2.0. In this model, the risk of interaction of entities is a measure to
decide proceeding interactions. If the risk of interaction is not acceptable by the entity,
the refuse or look search for alternatives otherwise, they take the risk and share the
required information [40]. This motivated us to work on a framework that can evaluate
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the risk of interaction and possible privacy protections to enable entities making decisions
that can protect their privacy in addition to resolving the interdependency problem.

4.5 Privacy Protection at the interaction level
In CDS, privacy can be reduced to operations and information which enables it being part
of information management. Information management also can be categorized as
information collection, information processing and information dissemination.

To

employ information management, it can be carried at the interaction level where the
information is collected, disseminated or processed. Providing privacy protection at the
interaction level is an architectural approach that can benefit various applications at
entities that are using interaction protocols to resolve their interdependency problem.
Entities might need to exchange information while they are interacting. This is the initial
point where the information is shared. However, it also emphasizes on the focus of this
work which is on message based interactions. Providing the privacy protection
mechanism at the interaction protocol enables applications on entities to delegate the
privacy resolution procedure to the interaction protocol and the solution space of those
applications will be limited to entities that can protect entities privacy.

4.5.1 Privacy-based interaction protocol
Depending on the type of interdependency, interaction can be modeled as the following:
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = < 𝛿, 𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 , 𝐼𝑃 >
𝛿 is the type of interdependency [19], 𝑒𝑖 is the entity that requires capabilities from an
entity such as 𝑒𝑗 . 𝐼𝑃 is the interaction protocol acquired by entities to coordinate their
activities. Message based interaction protocols can be modeled as a set of messages and
the pattern of sequences that includes messages that is exchanged among entities.
𝐼𝑃 =< 𝑀, 𝑆(𝑀) >
In the previous tuple, 𝑀 is the set of messages and S(𝑀) is denoting the sequences that
are generated by the protocol.
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Sequences in the interaction protocol refer to the pattern of the exchanged messages. In
fact, a given sequence indicates where information is collected and disseminated. As
described in the proposed privacy model, collecting and disseminating information can be
reduced at the operation level. Similarly, the existing sequences of an interaction protocol
also can be modeled by sequence of operations. Therefore, the structure of interaction
protocols can be reduced to operations and be modeled as:
𝐼𝑃 = [𝑜𝐼𝑃,1 , … , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 , … , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑄 ]

14.

To protect privacy at the interaction level, privacy protection mechanism should be
incorporated with the operations of interaction protocol. As discussed, privacy protection
mechanisms have set of operations that are executing in a specific order:
𝑂𝜇 = [𝑜𝑚,1 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝐷 ]

15.

Each of the operations of the privacy protection mechanism might belong to an entity that
exists in the environment. Our assumption is that the privacy protection mechanism
involves entities that match with the architecture of the interaction protocol.
The privacy protection management framework requires transforming the interaction
protocol to a protocol that is integrated with privacy protection mechanisms and delivers
the solution it is designed for. One of the objectives of the proposed framework is to
provide a solution space that meets the privacy requirements. To achieve this, the
framework merges the operations of the privacy protection mechanism with the
operations of the interaction protocol in a totally ordered fashion. It can happen in three
forms; either the protection mechanism operations is concatenated to the list of
interaction protocol operations as prefixes
[𝑜𝑚,1 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝐷 , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,1 , … , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑄 ]
Such as applying anonymization and encryption operation before sharing the information
with a service provider; or appended to them such as the operations that happens by reenforcements:
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[𝑜𝐼𝑃,1 , … , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑄 , 𝑜𝑚,1 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝐷 ]
It also can be merged in with other interaction protocol operations in a way that the order
of interaction protocol operations does not change and the order of mechanism operations
does not change yet they intervene. The location of intervention will be specified by
evaluating the message to verify if it belongs to sensitive information.
′

′

[𝑜𝐼𝑃,1 , … , 𝑜𝑚,1 , … , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , … , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , … , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑄 ]
By capturing the exposure boundary, it is possible to identify the sensitive information. If
information belongs to sensitive information, there is a protection mechanism that can
prevent the execution of non-authorized operations on them. Therefore, any operation in
interaction protocol that discloses the sensitive information will be substituted with
sequences of operations that include the protection mechanism.
Given the operations in IP and operations in protection mechanism, every operation in
protection mechanism has been targeted for protecting a sensitive information.
∀𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , ∃ 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 |IS (I𝑖,𝑘 , e𝑗 ) → ∃𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 , 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 ′ |𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 ′ , 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 ) ≡ 𝐷(𝐼𝑖,𝑘 ′ , 𝑒𝑗 ) ∧
𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝑑 →≠ (𝑜̿ 𝐼𝑃,𝑞 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 ′ , 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 ), I𝑖,𝑘 )
Therefore, any operations in interaction protocol that discloses the sensitive information
will be replaced by the sequence of the mechanism operation and interaction operation. It
can happen at two levels either at preventive level that can be prefixing:
⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ (𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 ) = [𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 ]
𝑆𝑒𝑞
or at the punishing level that can be appending:
⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ (𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 ) = [𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 ]
𝑆𝑒𝑞
Merging of the operations of privacy protection mechanism with operations of interaction
protocol requires extending the message types and sequences of the protocol as explained
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above. This becomes the extended interaction protocol that integrates the privacy
protection mechanism at the interaction level.
Let’s 𝑅𝑖 be the exposure boundary including information about information in 𝑒𝑖 . Based
on the information that is shared through the interaction protocol and the 𝑅𝑖 , there is a
protection mechanism that can prevent execution on non-authorized operations.
The proposed framework using the provided information at the risk evaluation, PPL
evaluation and the interaction protocol reduces the space of possible solutions to ones
that can provide the privacy protection expected. It can be modeled as
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑅𝑀𝐾 = < 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑃𝐵𝐼𝑃
>

Figure 3 depicts the operational view of the privacy protection management framework.
By applying the risk evaluation model, it is possible to identify the sensitive information
that might be shared among entities of the environment while interacting. The messages
and sequences of messages among entities construct the interaction protocol of that

Figure 3. Operational view of privacy protection management
framework
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environment. Providing the framework with the exposure boundary, the interaction
protocol, PPL evaluation and the type of privacy protection mechanisms the framework
can provide messages and sequences that represent the privacy based interaction protocol.
Entities that adhere to this interaction protocol seamlessly interact with other entities and
the interaction protocol applies the privacy protection operations to protect privacy
independent from the application. This allows the privacy protection in CDS be
incorporated at the architectural level and part of the computation platform.
The operations in the privacy protection mechanism may require new type of messages in
the message set of the protocol in addition to the extension on the sequence of interaction
protocol. Through accommodating privacy protection mechanism at the interaction
protocol level, the interaction is limited to entities that privacy can be protected with an
acceptable PPL in their interaction. The sequence of the operations in interaction protocol
is not changed in the privacy based interaction protocol but the operations of the privacy
protection mechanisms are applied. This can prevent or neutralize execution of nonauthorized operations and transforming the sensitive implicit information to explicit.
Each of the applied mechanisms has a PPL value. Several mechanisms can be integrated
with an interaction protocol to form a privacy based interaction protocol (𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃). By
putting an assumption on independency of the protection mechanisms, the PPL of the
protocol becomes the multiplication of PPL of all applied mechanisms.
𝑁
∗

𝑃𝑃𝐿 (𝑅 , ⋃ 𝐼𝑖 | ∈ (𝑒𝑖 , 𝑅 ∗ ), 𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃) =
𝑖=1

∐

𝑃𝑃𝐿(𝑒𝑗 , M(PB_IP), 𝜇)

∀ 𝜇,𝑗 | ∈(𝜇,𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃),∈(𝑒𝑗 ,𝑊)

16.
The privacy protection management framework identifies the sensitive information by
capturing SO information and their exposure boundary. This enables the framework to
identify what privacy mechanisms at the interaction protocol level is required. However,
the privacy based protocol extends the given interaction protocol without altering the
mechanism that the interaction protocol employ to resolve the interdependency problem.
Also, the incorporated privacy protection mechanisms does not change the architecture of
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interdependency resolution mechanisms but extends the protocol with adequate messages
and sequences to provide privacy protection with certain PPL level.

4.5.2 Privacy Protection Management Framework
In this work, we developed a privacy protection management framework that is applied at
the interaction level where the interaction protocol is expanded with additional operations
to support privacy protection. There are three theorems within the proposed framework
that we demonstrate the related formal proof in this section.

4.5.3 Privacy can sufficiently be protected at the interaction

level
The proposed framework provides the protection mechanisms at the interaction level. It
extends the interaction protocol with essential messages and sequences to protect the
sensitive information that is shared or disclosed in the original interaction protocol.
Theorem 3: For any incomplete knowledge CDS where entities adopt message-based
interaction, P-Model can be sufficiently addressed at the interaction level.
To provide the supporting materials for the above theorem, it is essential that we prove
the following points:


All the information that is shared or disclosed to other entities are decided at the
interaction level



Any class of privacy protection mechanism happens at the interaction level.

The computation entity in CDS has autonomy on coordinating activities with others. The
interaction layer manages the necessary processes to identify the adequate messages to
communicate to resolve the interdependency problem. The communication layer is
responsible for exchanging messages. However, it does not have the decision-making
authority on the messages to be sent and it is not aware of the intent that initiates the
exchange of messages.
Proof:
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Lemma 1: Let 𝑒𝑖 ≡< 𝐾𝑖 , 𝑃𝑆𝑖 , 𝐼𝑛𝑖 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖 > be the computation entity. For any information
𝐼𝑖,𝑟 that is going to be shared with 𝑒𝑗 , 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 ) is decided in 𝐼𝑛𝑖
If 𝑃𝑆𝑖 realizes that to achieve a goal, there is interdependency problem, 𝐼𝑛𝑖 finds a
coordination solution 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑗 with an entity such as 𝑒𝑗 .
If 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 is shared with 𝑒𝑗 ,
∃ 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , ∈ (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝐼𝑖𝑘 )|𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 )
Then there are two possibilities:
1. It is discovered at 𝑃𝑆𝑖 that 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 is required to perform the 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑗 therefore
𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑗 → 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 )
2. It is discovered at 𝐼𝑛𝑖 that 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 has to be shared with 𝑒𝑗
𝐼𝑛𝑖 → 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 )
In both cases, the shared information is processed and decided by the interaction layer.
Lemma 2: Let 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 be the information that is disclosed. For any 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 there is explicit
information that is shared
∃ 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 , ∈ (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝐼𝑖𝑘 )| 𝐷(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 )
When information is implicitly disclosed:
𝐷(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 ) → ∃ 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ , 𝑜𝑗,𝑤 | 𝑜𝑗,𝑤 (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ , 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 )
Assuming 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ is not shared through interaction. Then there are two possibilities:
1. Fact A: 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ is an auxiliary information disseminated by a third party 𝑒𝑡 then:
Using lemma 1:
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If 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ is shared to 𝑒𝑡 , then it has been decided at interaction
2. 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ is not shared with any entity, therefore:
a. Either 𝐷(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ , 𝑒𝑡 ) so that Fact A occurs
b. Or it has not been shared by interaction. This contradicts Lemma 1.
This proves that any information that is shared or disclosed has initiated sharing point at
the interaction.
In equation 8, Privacy protection in privacy model is defined as :
t
̂ j ) ≡ ∀ t , w| ⊂ (t, PS(Ii )) ∧ o̿̂̃
PP(ej , (PS(Ii )), O
j,w (t)
t
To achieve o̿̂̃
j,w (t), the privacy protection mechanisms are applied. The privacy

protection mechanisms can be classified at information or operation level.

Lemma 3: If a preventive protection mechanism at information exists, it happens at
the interaction.
Let 𝜇 be a preventive mechanism at information level for protecting 𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 ) in
t
which enables o̿̂̃
j,w (t).
t (t))
𝜇̿ → PP (ej , {Ii,r }, o̿̂̃
j,w

In Equation 10,
𝜇 ≡< 𝐼𝜇 , 𝑂𝜇 >
𝑂𝜇 = {𝑜𝑚,1 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝐷 } , 1 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝐷
Based on the execution of preventive protection mechanisms at information level in
equation 11:
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𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷 (𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−1 (𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−2 (I𝑖,k ) (𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−3 (I𝑖,k ) (… (𝑜̿ 𝑚,1 (I𝑖,k )))))) = 𝐼𝜇

This results in sharing information that is manipulated by the operations in
protection mechanisms.
𝜇̿ → 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ , 𝑒𝑗 )
Based on Lemma 1, 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ has to go through interactions. Therefore, the preventive
mechanisms at the information level can happen at the interaction level.
Lemma 4: If a preventive mechanism at operation level exists, it happens at interaction
level
Let 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 be the sensitive information that can implicitly be disclosed to 𝑒𝑗 through
𝑡
𝑜̂𝑗,𝑤
when 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ is shared.
𝑡
𝑡
𝑡
∃ 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ , 𝑒𝑗 , 𝑜̂𝑗,𝑤
| 𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 , 𝑜̂𝑗,𝑤
) ∧ 𝑜̂𝑗,𝑤
(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ , 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 ) ≡ 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ∧ 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ′ , 𝑒𝑗 )

Let 𝜇 be the protection mechanism at the operation level that can protect 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 .
𝜇 ≡< 𝐼𝜇 , 𝑂𝜇 >
𝑂𝜇 = {𝑜𝑚,1 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝐷 } , 1 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝐷
Based on the execution of the protection mechanisms at the operation:
𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷 ({𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−1 ({𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−2 ({𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , … , 𝑜̿ 𝑚,1 (𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , I𝑖,r )})})})
= {

∅
I𝑖,r"

𝑖𝑓 ∈ (𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑂̂𝑗𝑖 )
𝑖𝑓 ∉ (𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑂̂𝑗𝑖 )

which results in sharing I𝑖,r" or ∅. Therefore, based on Lemma 1, it happens at the
interaction level.
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Lemma 5: if there is punishing privacy protection mechanisms, it happens at the
interaction level.
Let 𝜇 ≡< 𝐼𝜇 , 𝑂𝜇 > be the punishing protection mechanism that protects 𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 ).
Based on the execution of punishing mechanisms in equation 13:
m,D ({𝑜
m,D−1 ({𝑜
m,D−2 (𝑜
m,1 ̂ 𝑖,𝑘 )})})}) ≡ 𝐼𝜇
̿̿̿̿̿̿
̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿
̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿̿
̿̿̿̿̿̿
̂ 𝑖,𝑘
̂ 𝑖,𝑘
̂ 𝑖,𝑘
̂ 𝑖,𝑘
∀ 𝑡, 𝑜
𝑗,𝑡 | o
𝑗,𝑡 , o
𝑗,𝑡 , o
𝑗,𝑡 , … , o (𝑜
𝑗,𝑡

The generated information in this mechanism is shared with the entity that has executed
the non-authorized operations.
𝜇̿ → 𝑆(𝐼𝜇 , 𝑒𝑗 )
This indicates that the punishing mechanisms happen at the interaction level.
Given Lemma 1, Lemma 2, Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, it is proven that any
protection mechanisms will be applied at the interaction level. Therefore, it is sufficient
to capture the privacy protection at the interaction level.

4.5.4 Quantifiable Protection in Privacy-Based Interactions
The privacy protection mechanisms can be classified as preventive at information,
preventive at operation and punishing mechanisms. In this section, we argue that for each
of the privacy protection mechanisms at information management, there are degrees of
probabilities for privacy protection when they are applied at the context of information
management.
Privacy protection mechanism at the information level attempts to manipulate the given
information. Such a characteristic makes the mechanism meaningful enough for the
service operations, and at the same time, it is a desirable choice as it does not disclose the
sensitive information. Typically, this happens by distorting the information by adding
noise or altering through particular formats. The major classes of mechanisms in this
category are anonymization and cryptographic methods. Anonymization methods are
associable with a degree of confidence factor that reflects the effectiveness of the
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anonymization function and the degree of re-identifying. For instance in 𝜀 −differential
privacy, higher level of 𝜀 has lower confidence factors in de-identifying and lower values
of are more effective in anonymizing information of the dataset [62]. In approaches such
as k-anonymity, l-diversity and t-closeness the parameter 𝑘, 𝑙 and 𝑡 reflect on the
capability of the anonymization function on the de-identifying information. Also,
cryptographic methods are mainly related to the difficulty of breaking the key that is used
for altering the information that is encrypted. However, based on the length of the key
that is used for encryption, the exhaustive methods in brute force fashion theoretically
can break the code. This will position the probability of cryptography systems is a
function of the length of the key.
The preventive privacy protection mechanisms at operation level can include contractual
cryptographic mechanisms, altering the non-authorized information and rule-based
mechanisms. There are efforts in formalizing the rule sets that are applied in privacy
mechanisms[22]. This allows analyzing information that will be protected by the privacy
protection rules. Furthermore, in a statistical analysis for a given mechanism such as
policy-based mechanisms, the probability distribution of the mechanism, it would be
possible to measure the probability of privacy protection of the mechanism.
The punishing privacy protection mechanisms are tailored to applying operations that
negatively impact the utility of the entity that executed the unauthorized operations. For
instance, the reputation systems and legal consequence of agreement violation affects
regressively on the utility of the entity if it exceeds the agreement. The study of the
impact of punishing mechanisms on the decision-making process of an entity to execute
unauthorized operations are captured in utility theories and economic mechanisms that
are part of the future works of the current research.
Through this, the privacy protection level of the interaction protocol that adopts the
privacy mechanisms in the context of information management is quantifiable.
For example, incorporating anonymization mechanism such as differential privacy,
encrypted bid submission, early registration and terms and condition types of agreement
in the PB_CNP will provide the following PPL:
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Assuming the information is segregated to the lowers possible granularity, the protection
mechanisms become independent from each other. Therefore:


Anonymization Differential Privacy: the probability of creating a differential
private function is (1 − 2𝜀)



Privately-Communicate-bid: the work in [57]has applied the public private key
cryptographic mechanism to communicate the bid value. Assuming the length
of the key is , the probability of breaking the code would be

1
2𝑛

. In practice,

breaking the cryptographic mechanisms that have high length key, it is close to
impossible. However, collusion of the participant entities may circumvent the
encryption mechanism. Assuming the probability of collusion among the
manager and the bidders in 𝑝′. Then the probability of this mechanism will be
1

𝑝′

𝑝′ + 2𝑛 − (2𝑛)


Early registration: To prevent sending task information to non-relevant potential
contractors, entities register their capabilities with the broker at the beginning. In
this mechanism the operation that was sharing sensitive information was
substituted with another operation that does not share the information. Hence,
the privacy protection level of this mechanism becomes 1 for the given
information.



Terms and condition support: assuming there is 𝑝" probability that the agreement
impacts the decisions of the participants of the agreement to not violate the
agreement.

Given the above mechanisms:
1

𝑝′

𝑃𝑃𝐿(𝑃𝐵𝐶𝑁𝑃) = (1 − 2𝜀) ∗ (𝑝′ + 2𝑛 − (2𝑛)) ∗ 𝑝"
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4.6 Solution equivalency
Although the framework is capable of providing a privacy based interaction protocol, it is
important to prove that the solutions reached using the traditional interaction protocol are
still attainable using the new protocol.
Merging the operations of the protection mechanism with operations of the interaction
protocol creates a new list of operations. Assuming 𝑆1 is the solution that is achieved
using 𝐼𝑃. That indicates that the list of operations of the interaction protocol has been
executed and completed. Assuming 𝑆2 is the solution achieved by 𝑃𝐵𝐼𝑃. Because the list
of operations and protection mechanism are totally ordered in the list of operations in
𝑃𝐵𝐼𝑃, the list of both interaction protocol and protection mechanism are executed and
completed. If 𝑆1 ≢ 𝑆2, either 1) the list of operations in interaction protocol are not
completed or 2) they are pre-empted by operations in protection mechanism.
The first condition cannot be true as the solution is achieved using 𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃and therefore,
all operations of the interaction protocol are executed and completed. However, the
second condition can be valid. When the privacy protection mechanism operations are
applied they might not be able to provide the necessary information for the interaction
protocol operations to proceed. That can disrupt the sequence and another solution gets
selected. Nonetheless, if the privacy protection mechanism operations cannot provide the
information for the next interaction protocol operation, it is due to transferring sensitive
information to outside of its exposure boundary. In the other word, if a solution is
achievable through 𝐼𝑃 , it can be achieved using 𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃 as well, unless it does not meet
the requirements for privacy. This is by design one of the objectives of the framework.
The solutions that can result in privacy concern are not acceptable solutions. Therefore,
any acceptable solution attainable by 𝐼𝑃 it can equivalently be reached by 𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃 as well.

4.7 Privacy Protection Management in the related works
In this section we provide a comparison between existing privacy models and practices
and the proposed privacy framework. The proposed privacy protection framework also
belongs to the architectural solutions, as it is an interaction-based framework and is
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applied at the computational platform of CDS applications. In other words, it is not
required to track the existing rules for each entity at each interaction. The interaction
protocol assesses the level of PPL and risk of interactions, which enables decisionmaking processes at the interaction level. Therefore, this model exhibits characteristics of
architectural approaches in privacy protection classes of solutions.
Many architectural based privacy solutions were proposed in the literature such as
anonymization techniques [23], [12], [13], privacy utility trade off mechanisms, [5], [67],
[14], social tradeoffs and proxy based privacy protection [16]. The proposed privacy
protection framework does not consider any assumption in having trusted entities in the
environment. In contrary many architectural-based solutions adhere to a particular setting
of interactions [23], [13]. Furthermore, sensitivity of the aggregated information might be
neglected in some forms of privacy models [23].
The utility tradeoff mechanisms are based on evaluating the information gain of the
exchanged information [14], [5]. The work in [16] illustrates that these models do not
necessarily reflect the preferences that each entity might have over their privacy.
Information gain by itself does not convey the expectation of entities over privacy. In
contrast, the proposed privacy model considers the sensitivity of information as a
computation element measured by processing the exposure boundaries that are captured
from each entity. In addition, the cost and risk evaluation functions that can be modeled
by incorporation of various elements that represents the preferences of an entity can
impact the decision making process.
The social tradeoff mechanisms measure the trust and intimacy relationship among
entities as well as the information gain. However, these traits are very difficult to validate
[16]. Typically, each entity has different criteria for intimacy and trust that might be
included in cost and risk evaluation function that is applied by the entity. This enables the
proposed model to be compatible with solutions that have the social aspects of
interactions embedded inside of the privacy protection mechanism.
In proxy-based approaches, there is a mediator entity that acts as a proxy for other
entities. It provides assessment over matching privacy expectation and the given privacy
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protection in interactions. These approaches are based on the strong assumption that
there are trusted entities that can be the proxy for other entities [16]. In contrary, the
proposed model does not include assumptions over trusting entities.

For every

interaction, the exposure boundary of the sharing information is evaluated and the proper
privacy protection mechanism is applied in the interaction protocol

4.8 Summary
Formal analysis of privacy is essential to apply privacy at the computation level.
Accordingly a privacy model is proposed in the context of information management
adequate for CDS environments that captures privacy as a mathematical object. The
solution approach presented in this work is an architectural-based solution that is
integrated at the interaction protocol. This work provides an analytical tool containing
sets of formulated concepts that are essential for evaluating the state of privacy in
computational systems. Additionally, it presents a framework for protecting privacy that
is applicable on interaction of entities.
Modeling privacy in the context of information management, privacy in CDS can be
reduced as the state of the exposure boundary of entities’ states with the outside world.
State of entities can be modeled by information. Therefore, when the information is
communicated inside the boundary it is considered as non-sensitive and when it is
exposed to outside of the boundary, it is sensitive information. The exposure can happen
through sharing information or disclosure of information. Because entities can be
classified as explicit and implicit information, the privacy concern is about the disclosure
of sensitive implicit information. Any operation in implicit information that can extract
sensitive information is considered to be unauthorized. There is an agreement among
entities that the unauthorized operations are not executed on information. Disobeying the
agreement and applying the unauthorized operation is considered as privacy violation. In
contrast, utilizing a mechanism that can prevent or neutralize non authorized operations
from execution is denoted as privacy protection.
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The proposed model is a complete view for privacy in information management in CDS
which is capable of reducing other types of privacy models to information management
and therefore to the proposed privacy model.
In many applications of CDS environment, realizing the conditions for protecting privacy
is incorporated with uncertainty. Entities have incomplete knowledge about
communicated information as well as all operations in other entities. Therefore, it is
required to provide metrics that can measure the uncertainty level towards privacy
protection. The proposed privacy framework addresses the uncertainty of protecting
privacy using the protection mechanism with the concept of PPL. PPL is the conditional
probability of applying a protection mechanism under the space of an entity’s
information. This value becomes a measure for evaluating decisions in interaction of
entities. Also the proposed framework provides formal analysis of applying the protection
mechanism at the interaction level. The integration of the mechanism and interaction
protocol results in privacy based interaction protocol that incorporates necessary,
messages and sequences to support privacy protection at the interaction level.

68

Chapter 5

5

Privacy- Aware Agent Model and Implementation

The proposed privacy protection management framework is a generic approach to
provide a privacy protection interaction protocol. It can be used as an analytical tool to
identify concerns in an interaction protocol and can be incorporated with protection
mechanisms. At the same time, it can be applied at the computation level and automate
privacy protection management in the computation entity. Any solution achieved at the
computation level requires problem solving and coordination with other entities. Thus
far, we have proven that privacy resolution is essential at the computation in order to
reach to acceptable solutions. Application of privacy protection management frameworks
at the computation level provides privacy aware computation platform; all of the concepts
of the privacy model are modeled by computational elements. Our contribution in this
chapter includes designing and developing privacy-aware computation entity in agentbased model.

5.1 Privacy: Computation Concept in Computation Entity
Interactions are the mechanism of coordination used to resolve interdependency problem.
Through this, computation entities can adequately be modeled as CIR agents in which
they have knowledge, problem solving capabilities, interaction, and communication [19].
Figure 4 shows the logical architecture of a computation entity.

Figure 4. Logical Architecture of Computation
Entity in CDS environments
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𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 ≡ < 𝐾𝑖 , 𝑃𝑆𝑖 , 𝐼𝑛𝑖 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖 >
In information management form of computation, entities are modeled as information and
operation.
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑖 ≡< 𝐼𝑖 , 𝑂𝑖 >
Knowledge in entities conveys all information regarding, intentions, believes and states
of the entity. This includes the information regarding operations that the entity possesses
and is capable of applying them. This allows modeling the knowledge as set of
information and operations as the following:
𝐾𝑖 ≡ < 𝐼𝑖𝑘 , 𝑂𝑖𝑘 > , ⊆ (𝐼𝑖 , 𝐼𝑖𝑘 ), ⊆ (𝑂𝑖 , 𝑂𝑖𝑘 )

17.

Problem solving in computation entities is an adjoined layer of the knowledge. It
consists of operations to identify goals and required actions towards achieving it through
the information acquired from knowledge. Because of this problem solving can be
modeled as operation in information management.
𝑃𝑆𝑖 ≡ 𝑂𝑖𝑝𝑠 , ⊂ ( 𝑂𝑖𝑝𝑠 , 𝑂𝑖 )

18.

The computation entity at the interaction level encloses pattern of communication as well
as decision-making on coordination to resolve interdependency problem. Interaction layer
is adjacent to the knowledge, problem solver and communication layers. Through this,
the interaction can be modeled as information and operations
𝐼𝑛𝑖 ≡ < 𝐼𝑖𝐼𝑛 , 𝑂𝑖𝐼𝑛 > , ⊂ (𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑛 , 𝐼𝑖 ), ⊂ (𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑛 , 𝑂𝑖 )

19.

The communication layer encompasses the messages that will be communicated to other
entities, but it does not interfere with coordinating the decision-making processes. The
communication layer is modeled as information in information management.
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖 ≡ 𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑚 , ⊂ (𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑚 , 𝐼𝑖 )

20.
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Privacy is the concern of decentralized environments in which entities share information
through communication-based interactions. Naturally, privacy as a computation concept
is inherently expressed at the interaction level. Privacy solutions at the entity level
facilitate entities by interacting with other entities that are driven by privacy aware
interactions. The solution at the computation entity allows the environment to achieve
global solutions in which entities’ privacy is respected. Figure 5 depicts the relationship
of the privacy solution with other layers in the computation entity.
Applying proposed privacy protection management frameworks at the computation level
incorporates privacy protection management directly with the interaction. Privacy
solutions stand between communications and interactions to consolidate interactions with
privacy-based interaction protocol and privacy protection management.
As described in the privacy protection management framework, interaction protocols can
be modeled as sets of messages and sequences thereof:
𝐼𝑃 ≡ < 𝑀, 𝑆𝑀 >
𝑀 ≡ {𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑚 }, 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑍

Figure 5. Privacy solution in relation with interaction in the
computation entity in CDS environment
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Each message in the interaction protocol conveys content; this content involves a a
sending and receiving entity and operations that transfer the message.
𝑚𝑚 ≡< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑟 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 > , 𝑒𝑟 : 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟, 𝑒𝑠 : 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝐶𝑚 : 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 , ∈ (𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑖 ) , ∈
(𝑂𝑠,𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠) 21.
Sequences are constructed by patterns of exchanging messages.
Assuming,
𝑀𝑘 : 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑀 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑘 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
Then
𝑍
∗

𝑀 ≡ ⋃ 𝑀𝑘 , 𝑀∗ : 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑞𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑀
𝑘=1

Therefore,
𝑆𝑀 ⊂ 𝑀∗
𝑆𝑀 = [𝑠1 , … , 𝑠𝑞 ], 1 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑄

22.

Each sequence carries multiple messages
𝑠𝑞 = [𝑚𝑎+1 , … , 𝑚𝑎+𝑋 ], 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑉, 1 ≤ 𝑋 ≤ 𝑍 23.
which can include several sub-sequences:
𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 ≡ [𝑚𝑎+𝑙 , … , 𝑚𝑎+𝑝 ], 1 ≤ 𝑙, 𝑝 ≤ 𝑋, 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑉,
1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇, 𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 : 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
Let 𝑠𝑞∗ be the set of all subsequences of a sequence. Then:
𝑠𝑞∗ ≡ ⋃ 𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
1≤𝑡≤𝑍

24.
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25.
𝑜
As messages are bound to operations that deliver them, 𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
represents all of the

operations of a subsequence:
𝑝
𝑜
𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
≡ ⋃ 𝑜|𝑜 ≡ 𝑂𝑖,𝑎+ℎ ∧ ∈ (𝑚𝑎+ℎ , 𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 )
ℎ=𝑙

26.
𝑜
𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
≡ [𝑜𝑖,𝑎+𝑙 , … , 𝑜𝑖,𝑎+𝑝 ], 1 ≤ 𝑙, 𝑝 ≤ 𝑋, 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑉

27.

Therefore, the execution of a the operations of a subsequence on the set of messages of
an interaction protocol is denoted as
𝑜 (𝑀)
𝑠𝑠
̿ 𝑞,𝑡
≡ 𝑜̿𝑖,𝑎+𝑙 (𝐶𝑎+𝑙 , 𝑜̿𝑖,𝑎+(𝑙+1) (… , 𝑜̿𝑖,𝑎+𝑝 (𝐶𝑎+𝑝 )) 28.

5.1.1 Privacy Protection Management
To capture privacy at the computation level and provide protection mechanism, it is
required to incorporate privacy in interactions. Interactions are steered by interaction
protocols that can be modeled as messages and sequences of messages. Privacy
Protection Management is responsible in identifying privacy concerns in interaction
protocols and providing privacy based interaction protocol that encompasses the
protection operations to protect privacy. The logical architecture of the privacy protection
management layer in the computation entity in CDS environments is depicted in Figure 6.

5.1.2 Capturing information and the exposure boundaries
Privacy in the context of information management is the state of exposure boundary of
information that includes entities for which sharing information can happen. Knowledge
in the computation entity includes all information, intentions, believes as well as the
exposure boundary of information
⊆ (𝐼𝑖 , 𝐼𝑖𝑘 ) , ∀ 𝑘, ⊂ (𝐸𝑖,𝑘 , 𝐼𝑖𝑘 )
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Information is shared through messages of interaction protocol. By capturing the receiver
entities of the messages in the interaction protocol, the participating entities in the
interaction will be identified. Based on equation 21:
𝑚𝑚 ≡< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑚 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 > , 𝑒𝑠 : 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 , 𝑒𝑚 : 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟, 𝐶𝑚 : 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 , ∈ (𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑖 ) ,
∈ (𝑂𝑠,𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠 )

Therefore:
𝑍
∗

𝑅 ≡

⋃ 𝑒𝑚 , 𝑒𝑠 | ∈ (< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑚 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 >, 𝑀), 𝑅 ∗ ∶ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑚=1,𝑠=1

29.
Figure 6 shows the logical architecture of the privacy aware computation entity. Within
this architecture, the Exposure Boundary layer collects the exposure boundaries of the
information that is shared in interaction protocols.

Figure 6. The logical architecture of privacy protection
management in computation entity in CDS environments
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5.1.3 Identifying the Sensitive Information
By applying the framework principles and given the exposure boundaries, the sensitive
information can be captured as the following:
𝑘≤𝑁,𝑗≤𝑊

𝐼𝑖𝑠 ≡

⋃ (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )| ∈ (𝑒𝑗 , (𝑅 ∗ − 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 )) , 𝐼𝑖𝑠 : 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑘=1,𝑗=1

30.
As depicted in Figure 6, the layer of “Sensitive Information” is adjacent to exposure
boundary and interaction. This allows this layer to capture the necessary elements from
the exposure boundary and interaction protocol to identify sensitive information.

5.1.4 Diagnosing Privacy Concerns in the Interaction Protocol
Interaction protocol follows a sequence of messages among entities. These messages
have content that carries required information to follow the protocol. In this context,
messages are tied to operations that deliver the content from one entity to another. This
positions messages in conjunction with operations equivalent to sharing.
Considering equation 21:
𝑀 ≡ {𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑚 }, 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑍
𝑚𝑚 ≡< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑚 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 > , 𝑒𝑠 : 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 , 𝑒𝑚 : 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟, 𝐶𝑚 : 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 , ∈ (𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑖 ) ,
∈ (𝑂𝑠,𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠 )

𝑂𝑠,𝑚 delivers the messages transferred to the communication layer. Therefore:
𝑘
𝑘 ))
𝑂𝑠,𝑚 ≡ = (𝐼𝑚
, ⋃(𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑚

Based on equation 5 in the privacy protection management framework, Sharing 𝐶𝑚 is :
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𝑆(𝐶𝑚 , 𝑒𝑚 ) ≡ = (𝐼𝑚 , ⋃(𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑚 ))
We also know that:
𝑘
⊆ (𝐼𝑚 , 𝐼𝑚
)

This shows that:
𝑘
𝑘 ))
𝑆(𝐶𝑚 , 𝑒𝑚 ) ≡ = (𝐼𝑚
, ⋃(𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑚

Therefore:
𝑆(𝐶𝑚 , 𝑒𝑚 ) ≡ 𝑂𝑠,𝑚
The content of messages convey information that might disclose sensitive information in
conjunction with other messages of the sequence. This results in disclosing sensitive
information when the sequences of messages are exchanged. The sensitive information is
computed by capturing the exposure boundaries. Therefore, evaluating sub-sequences of
the interaction protocol to identify disclosing sensitive information is essential.
𝑞≤𝑄,𝑗≤𝑊,𝑡≤𝑇,𝑘≤𝑁

𝐻𝑖∗

≡

⋃

𝑜 (𝑀),
(𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 , 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 )| ( = (𝑠𝑠
̿ 𝑞,𝑡
𝐼𝑖,𝑘 ) ∧ 𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 ) )

𝑞=1,𝑗=1,𝑡=1,𝑘=1

31.
Also, non-sensitive information can be used as auxiliary information to transform implicit
sensitive information to explicit. Typically, the preventive mechanisms cannot be applied
for auxiliary information as they are shared within the exposure boundary. To deal with
this, entities comply with agreements and applying punishing mechanisms. The concern
regarding the auxiliary information can be identified through exploring the receivers and
the information shared with them in a sequence of messages in the interaction protocol.
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𝑞≤𝑄,𝑗≤𝑊,𝑡≤𝑇,𝑘≤𝑁

𝐴∗𝑖 ≡

𝑜
([𝑜], 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 )| ∈ (𝑜, 𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
) ∧ 𝑜̿ ≡ 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )

⋃
𝑞=1,𝑗=1,𝑡=1,𝑘=1

32.
Hence, the concern points in the interaction protocol can be identified as follows:
𝐷𝑖∗ ≡ ⋃(𝐻𝑖∗ , 𝐴∗𝑖 ), 𝐷𝑖∗ : 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠
33.

5.1.5 Determining Required Protection Operations with

adequate PPL
Protection operations are part of the knowledge of the entity. Entities can utilize various
protection operations that are registered within the knowledge of the entity. Protection
mechanisms such as differential privacy anonymization [62], private bid-communication
[57] and contractual operation execution[68] are examples of protection operations that
can dynamically be registered in an entity and be applied on the interaction protocol.
Each protection operation comes with the associated PPL that will be used as a measure
to evaluate the privacy state of the privacy-based interaction protocol.
Protection Operation Registration:
𝑅𝑒𝑔(𝑒𝑖 , 𝜇, 𝑃𝑃𝐿) ≡ = (𝑂𝑖𝑘 , ⋃(𝑂𝑖𝑘 , 𝜇)) ∧ = (𝐼𝑖𝑘 , ⋃(𝐼𝑖𝑘 , 𝑃𝑃𝐿(𝜇)))
A protection operation in a computation entity when the 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑃𝐿 = Α is
denoted as:
Protection Operation:
𝜇𝑖,𝑘 ≡ 𝜇 | ∈ (𝜇, 𝑂𝑖𝑘 ) ∧ ∃𝑗 , ∈ ((𝑖𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 ), 𝐼𝑖𝑠 ) ∧ ∃ ⊂ (𝑆, 𝐼𝑖 ) ∧
∈ (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑆) ∧ 𝑃𝑃(𝜇|𝑆) ∧ 𝑃𝑃𝐿(𝜇) > 𝐴
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Depending on the sequence of messages in the interaction protocol and the identified
privacy concern, an adequate protection operation is required to be applied. Based on the
above definition, Protection Operation layer performs analysis on the given sequences
and the expected PPL value to retrieve the adequate protection operation among available
protection operations.

5.1.6 Expanding the Messages and Sequences
The privacy protection management framework introduces three forms of expansions in
interaction protocol: prefixing, appending and generic. In the generic forms of expansion,
for each of subsequences tagged as concern point, the privacy-based sequence will be
substituted with the original one. The concerns marked as auxiliary will be extended with
punishing protection operations as well as the structure to include the adequate
agreements.
Depending on the content that is shared in a subsequence, it might be tagged as concern
point multiple times. Let 𝜆𝑞,𝑡 be the sensitive information that 𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 is tagged for. Based
on equation 24 and 31:
𝑘≤𝑁

𝜆𝑞,𝑡 ≡ ⋃ 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 | ∈ ((𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 , 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 ) , 𝐻𝑖∗ )
𝑘=1

𝜆𝑞,𝑡 ≡ {𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , … , 𝐼𝑖,𝑢 }
Then we can retrieve the protection record of the information in 𝜆𝑞,𝑡
𝑘≤𝑁

𝜇(𝜆𝑞,𝑡 ) ≡ ⋃ 𝜇𝑖,𝑘 | ∈ (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝜆𝑞,𝑡 )
𝑘=1

and let 𝜆′𝑞,𝑡 be the information that might be used as auxiliary information in a sequence:
𝑘≤𝑁

𝜆′𝑞,𝑡 ≡ ⋃ 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 |(𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 , 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 ) ∈ 𝐴∗𝑖
𝑘=1
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𝜆′𝑞,𝑡 ≡ {𝐼𝑖,𝑘′ , … , 𝐼𝑖,𝑢′ }
Similarly the protection record of the information in 𝜆′𝑞,𝑡 is

𝑘≤𝑁

𝜇(𝜆′𝑞,𝑡 ) ≡ ⋃ 𝜇𝑖,𝑘 |𝐼𝑖,𝑘 ∈ 𝜆′𝑞,𝑡
𝑘=1

Also
𝑜
𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
≡ [𝑜𝑖,𝑎+𝑙 , … , 𝑜𝑖,𝑎+𝑝 ], 1 ≤ 𝑙, 𝑝 ≤ 𝑋, 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑉

34.

Then
𝑜
𝑃𝐵_𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 ) ≡ 𝑃𝑢𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣 (𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
, 𝜇(𝜆𝑞,𝑡 )) , 𝜇(𝜆′𝑞,𝑡 )) 35.

𝑜
𝑜
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣 (𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
, 𝜇(𝜆𝑞,𝑡 )) ≡ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
, 𝜇(𝜆𝑞,𝑡 )) 36.

𝑜
𝑃𝑢𝑛 (𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
, 𝜇(𝜆′𝑞,𝑡 )) ≡

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑔 ([< 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 >, <
𝑜
𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 >], 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
, 𝜇(𝜆′𝑞,𝑡 ))) 37.

The privacy based sequence for the subsequences that do not belong to concern points
will stay as the original subsequence. This is due to 𝜇(𝜆𝑞,𝑡 ) ≡ ∅ and 𝜇(𝜆′𝑞,𝑡 ) ≡ ∅.
The sequences of the privacy-based interaction protocol are the set of all sequences or
their privacy based sequences substitutions if they are among the concern points.
𝑞≤𝑄,𝑡≤𝑇

𝑃𝐵_𝑆𝑀 ≡ ⋃ 𝑃𝐵_𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 )
𝑞=1,𝑡=1

38.
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The messages that are exchanged in these sequences will form the set of messages that
the privacy-based interaction protocol utilizes.
𝑞≤𝑄,𝑡≤𝑇,𝑠≤𝑅,𝑟≤𝑅

𝑃𝐵𝑀 ≡

⋃

𝑜
< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑟 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 > |∈ (𝑂𝑠,𝑚 , 𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
), ⊂ (𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑖 ), ∈ (𝑒𝑟 , 𝑅 ∗ ),

𝑞=1,𝑡=1,𝑠=1,𝑟=1

∈ (𝑒𝑠 , 𝑅 ∗ )

39.
This completes the necessary elements to present the privacy-based interaction protocol.
𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃 ≡< 𝑃𝐵𝑀 , 𝑃𝐵_𝑆𝑀 >
There will be more discussions on Contract Net Protocol (CNP) as an example of
interaction protocol in Chapter 6. This protocol is converted to the above elements and
the computation entity adopted the privacy based contract net protocol.

5.1.7 Expanding Computation Entity with Privacy Solution
Earlier in this chapter we provided the analysis on application of the proposed privacy
protection framework at the computation level. The elements of the privacy protection
management are determined using computational concepts at the entity level. In this
section we show that privacy as a computation concept in a computation solution.
In distributed decentralized computing systems, the solution is achieved by capturing the
solution at the problems solver 𝑃𝑆 and the coordination solution (𝐶𝑆) in interaction [19].
𝑆 ≡ 𝑓(𝑃𝑆, 𝐶𝑆)
Consider the following example:
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 1: 𝐼𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑖,𝑘
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 2: 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦
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Agent 1 and Agent 2 can interact with each other and share 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 as they belong to the
exposure boundary. However, because Agent 2 requires interacting with another agent
which is outside of the exposure boundary, 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 will be disclosed to entities outside of the
exposure boundary and they can extract it. Hence, the solution is not feasible and the
solution does not exist (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Solution without privacy protection does not exist

If privacy solution is not applied the system can reach to a feasible solution. However, by
applying privacy protection mechanism, the solution can be reached. For instance the
Figure 8 shows a solution that can be approved using privacy protection mechanism
applied on information before it goes outside of the exposure boundary.

Figure 8. Solution Exists with Applying Privacy Protection
Mechanism
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When the computation solution reaches to a solution, it is essential that the solution can
provide an adequate level of privacy protection. This indicates that the coordination
solution compares the possible choices in regards to privacy for instance:
𝑆 ≡ 𝑓(𝑃𝑆, 𝐶𝑆)𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑗 ?
𝑆 ≡ 𝑓(𝑃𝑆, 𝐶𝑆)𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑗 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑?
This illustrates that the computation function is expecting a new dimension to be able to
make a decision on the solution. There could be possible solutions that can perform the
requested task, but the one with privacy will be accepted. This expands the computation
with a new parameter that reflects the solution for privacy:
𝑆 ≡ 𝑓(𝑃𝑆, 𝐶𝑆, 𝑃𝑟𝑆)

5.2 Implementation Challenges
The sequences of the privacy-based interaction protocol are the set of all sequences or
their privacy based sequences substitutions if they are among the concern points in
equation 39.
𝑞≤𝑄,𝑡≤𝑇

𝑃𝐵_𝑆𝑀 ≡ ⋃ 𝑃𝐵_𝑆𝑒𝑞(𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡 )
𝑞=1,𝑡=1

Based on equation 39, the messages that are exchanged in these sequences will form the
set of messages that the privacy-based interaction protocol utilizes.

𝑞≤𝑄,𝑡≤𝑇,𝑠≤𝑅,𝑟≤𝑅

𝑃𝐵𝑀 ≡

⋃

𝑜
< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑟 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 > |∈ (𝑂𝑠,𝑚 , 𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡
), ⊂ (𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑖 ), ∈ (𝑒𝑟 , 𝑅 ∗ ),

𝑞=1,𝑡=1,𝑠=1,𝑟=1

∈ (𝑒𝑠 , 𝑅 ∗ )
This completes the necessary elements to present the privacy-based interaction protocol.
𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃 ≡< 𝑃𝐵𝑀 , 𝑃𝐵_𝑆𝑀 >
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The component diagram of the privacy protection management is presented in Figure 9.

5.3 JIAC: Implementation Platform
JIAC (Java Intelligent Agent Component) is a framework for developing distributed
heterogeneous, complex systems. This platform supports the developments of MultiAgent Systems (MAS) through features such as [28]:

Figure 9. The Competent architecture of Privacy Protection Management
in Computation entity



Spring-Based Component System



ActiveMQ-based messaging



JMX-based management



Transparent distribution
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Applying the privacy protection management framework at the computation level,
requires expanding on the computation entity. It requires developing a CDS environment

Figure 10. JIAC Applications and the relationships to other
JIAC Concepts [28]
where autonomous self-interested entities interact. JIAC platform enables developing
distributed decentralized setting in which the communication and agent life cycle
management is steered by the platform. JIAC flexibly incorporates new behaviors to the
agent which is essential for expanding new message types at the interaction protocol. On
that account, JIAC is an adequate platform for implementing the privacy aware
computation entity.

5.3.1 JIAC Platform
JIAC applications typically inherit decentralized distributed context, which consist of
multiple Agent Nodes.

The AgentNode is a computation-service platform that is

architected as distributed layer providing services to agents. Each AgentNode includes
several Agent Components. Each of which contains classes of beans that specify the
behavior of the Agent (Figure 10).
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5.3.2 Agent Life Cycle
The agent life cycle refers to the state that an agent can be in which is steered by the
AgentNode . Additionally the agent and agent beans can perform processes when the
state changes in an agent. Figure 11 shows the agent life cycle in JIAC platform.

Figure 11. Agent Life Cycle in JIAC Platform [28]

5.3.3 Agent Actions
Actions are part of the trait of agent beans in JIAC that allows the asynchronous
execution of behaviors in agents. All the operations including the protection operations
and interaction operations are implemented as an action in the JIAC platform. Actions
can be added dynamically to the memory of the agent. It can scale up to the agent node as
well as direct the agent to be accessible by search inquiries. In this work, we have
introduced the actions at node level. Actions are searched by template specification
which specifies that characteristics of an action to be called. When the protection
operations are registered, the template of their action is added to the agent and it will be
called when the action is searched through the agent memory. Actions can perform send
operations as well as performing processing operations. The flexibility of the dynamic
action allowed us to implement the operations of the sequences of the interaction protocol
as an action within an agent. Before the agent gets to the ready state, the action list is
updated so that the agent accesses the necessary actions.

85

Figure 12 shows part of the execution of the bean that dynamically adds the template of
the action to the agent.

Figure 12. Adding Dynamic Action to the agent at Node level

5.3.4 Privacy Protection Management in JIAC Agent
The following is the details of implementation of privacy aware computation entity
within JIAC agent platform. Some of the proposed components are employed to resolve
the requirements and restriction of implementation platform.
In JIAC application, interaction sequences can be modeled as set of actions that
performed by entities. Each of the messages and protection operations is captured as
actions.
The Privacy Protection Management expands the interaction protocol with adequate
protection operations and provides privacy based interaction protocol. Privacy Based
Interaction Protocol manages all interactions of the computation entity with others
through which the adequate privacy protection operations are applied. The messages and
sequences of messages that are sent for communication are managed by the privacy
aware interaction protocol. The functionalities of this layer can be categorized as follows:
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Figure 13. Component diagram of the implemented JIAC agent

A. Expanding the message indexes with the new and modified message types.
B. Managing sequences of the protocol upon receiving new messages when entities
interact.
A is packaged as the functionalities of “Action_Management” component in the
component architecture diagram. B is the functionality of the “Sequence_Manegemt”
component in the component diagram. The component architecture is shown in Figure
13. The class diagram of the Privacy Protection Management component is provided in
Figure 14. This component applies the privacy protection management framework at the
computation entity and expands the interaction protocol with the privacy based
interaction protocol. Also, the class diagram of the components of the JIAC agent is
provided in Figure 15.
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Figure 14. Privacy Protection Management component

5.4 Summary
The proposed privacy protection framework is a generic model that can be used as an
analytical tool for identifying privacy states of interaction protocol as well as getting
applied in contexts such as computation level. Capturing privacy as a computation
concept necessitates incorporating privacy in the computation entity at interaction level.
The computation entity in CDS environment requires resolving interdependency problem
through interaction. The privacy based interaction protocol enables the entity to become
privacy aware in its interactions. In this chapter, we provided the computational aspect
related to privacy protection management framework. We also adopted the JIAC agent
component ware as the implementation platform for the entities that are implemented as
agents. Every operation in JIAC agents is modeled through actions. The messages and
sequences of the privacy based interaction protocol are incorporated in actions each of
which is dynamically added to the agent memory. In this chapter, the supporting
argument to validate the sufficiency and adequacy of the proposed privacy model and

88

Figure 15. Class Diagram of components of JIAC Agent
privacy protection management in CDS is presented. The proposed privacy protection
framework that is applied at the computation level expands the computation solution with
new parameter that reflects the coordination with entities and performing actions that can
protect privacy.
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Chapter 6

6

A Privacy-based Interaction for CNP Protocol

Interaction protocols are the mechanism used to resolve interdependency problem in
CDS. One of the approaches to interact is through negotiation [69], [70]. Contract Net
Protocol (CNP) is a negotiation-based protocol that is applied for task allocation in CDS
[71], [69]. Because of capability interdependency among various entities of CDS, they
assign their tasks to others. CNP is an assignment interaction protocol that initially was
proposed for distributed problem solving among various sensors. The messages of this
protocol convey information that might disclose sensitive information. By applying the

Figure 16. Contract Net Protocol
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privacy protection management framework on this protocol, the privacy concerns are
identified and proper protection operation is applied.

6.1 Contract Net Protocol
CNP contains manager sensors that announce a task to other sensors. The rest of entities
[potential contractors] that are capable of executing the task compete for acquiring it. The
entity that its proposal is accepted becomes the contractor and delivers the result after
executing it [71]. Figure 16, shows different stages of contract net protocol to resolve an
assignment interdependency. CNP can be expanded to be applied on brokering
architecture in which to resolve the capability interdependency in such setting, entities
adopt CNP as the interaction protocol where the brokering layer acts as the manager. The
sequence presentation of CNP as discussed in previous section includes a set of
sequences for operations in task announcement, winner determination and task execution.
CNP = {< 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡), 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘_𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(), 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒(𝐵𝑖𝑑),
Accept_Proposal, Inform, Response >,
< 𝑇𝑎𝑠_𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒(𝐵𝑖𝑑), 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙 >,
< 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘_𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘), 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 >}

“Task announcement” is a phase in CNP to inform entities about the characteristics of a
task. Manager is responsible to send the “task announcement” to other entities. The
information embedded in “task announcement” contains: eligibility specification, task
abstraction, bid specification and expiration time. “Eligibility specification” conveys a
list of criteria that an entity needs to have to be eligible to submit a bid. “task abstraction”
includes information that briefly explains the task to be executed. “bid specification” is
an indicator for potential contractors to know how the manager wants to receive the bids.
Finally, the “expiration time” is a deadline for the execution of the task. After awarding
the task to the contractor, they still can interact by information messages. These messages
can be the interim or final report of the execution of the task. They also can be
“REQUEST” messages. If the contractor needs to receive more information to complete
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the task, it will send a “REQUEST” message to the manager. If the requested information
is not in the “MUST HAVE” list and it is transferable, the manager collects the
information and sends it to the contractor. If the contract requires other capabilities from
others to execute the task, it can create sub tasks out of the executing task and request for
help from other entities. The manager can specify the entities that the contractor can send
the subtask to [71].
“Collecting responses” or bid proposal is a process that all entities that receive the task
announcement evaluate the task and if they are capable of executing the task, they send
their bids for the task, otherwise; they reject it.
In winner determination process, the manager collects all the bids from the potential

Figure 17. Traditional CNP
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contractors and selects the best bid. The selected contracted will be awarded in the
awarding process. The sequence diagram of the traditional CNP is shown in Figure 17.
Entities share information using the message types and sequences of messages in CNP.
However, privacy concerns in sharing information in CNP is not considered and
providing privacy protection at this protocol is lacking. In this protocol,







Requester (𝑒𝑟 ): The entity that has a task and needs a manager entity to find a
contractor for executing the task
Manager (𝑒𝑚 ): the entity that searches for the contractor that can perform a task
Potential Contractor (𝑒𝑝 ): the entity that is a candidate for being awarded by the
task
Non eligible potential contractors (𝑒𝑛 ): the entity that is not capable of executing
the task
Sub contractors (𝑒𝑠 ): the entity that is awarded by a subtask
Contractor (𝑒𝑐 ): the entity that is awarded by the task

Given the information that is shared in CNP, here are the exposure boundaries associated
to the information:
𝐼𝑟,𝑡 = {𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒, 𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘_𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡} and exposure boundary 𝐼𝑟,𝑡 is 𝐸𝑟,𝑡 = {𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟}
𝐼𝑝,𝑏 = {bid } and the exposure boundary 𝐼𝑝,𝑏 is 𝐸𝑝,𝑏 = ∅
𝐼𝑟,𝑗 = {𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 }and the exposure boundary of 𝐼𝑟,𝑗 is 𝐸𝑟,𝑗 = {𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟}
𝐼𝑟,ℎ = {task_history(𝑒𝑟 ) }and the exposure boundary of 𝐼𝑟,ℎ is 𝐸𝑟,ℎ = ∅
𝐼𝑟,𝑠 = {result_history(𝑒𝑟 ) }and the exposure boundary of 𝐼𝑟,𝑗 is 𝐸𝑟,𝑠 = ∅
𝐼𝑟,𝑔 = {subtask(𝐼𝑟,𝑡 ) }and the exposure boundary of 𝐼𝑟,𝑔 is 𝐸𝑟,𝑔 = {𝑒𝑣 , … , 𝑒𝑓 }
CNP has been used in many examples of CDS environments. However, this protocol
does not apply privacy protection mechanisms while sharing information among entities.
Using the proposed privacy protection management framework, we can transform CNP to
a privacy based contract net interaction protocol. The privacy protection management
framework considers the exposure boundaries and identifies the sensitive information is
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shared or may be implicitly disclosed to other entities. Accordingly, here is the sensitive
information that is identified in CNP for which privacy protection mechanism should be
applied:


I S (𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , 𝑒𝑝 )



I S (𝐼𝑝,𝑏 , 𝑒𝑚 )



I S (𝐼𝑟,𝑗 , 𝑒𝑚 )



I S (𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , 𝑒𝑠 )



I S (𝐼𝑟,ℎ , 𝑒𝑚 )



I S (𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , 𝑒𝑛 )



I S (𝐼𝑟,𝑠 , 𝑒𝑐 )

6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
𝐸𝑟,𝑡 which is the exposure boundary of 𝐼𝑟,𝑡 only includes the manager entity. 𝐼𝑟,𝑡 is the
combination of identity of the requester and the task that is submitted to the manager. The
structure of task announcement is as the following:
<task-announcement> ⇒ TASK-ANNOUNCEMENT [name] {task-abstraction}
{eligibility-specification} {bid-specification} [expiration-time]
Because the exposure boundary of 𝐼𝑟,𝑡 does not include potential contractors,
combination of task announcement and identification of entities in CDS is sensitive
information in relation with potential contractors. For instance, the task announcement of
er might include the inquiry to activate light monitoring service in particular time slots of
days. As an example the building management software that tracks various buildings of a
house holding company is using light sensors for security reasons but they only activate
them in low human traffic hours. They also work with entities monitoring power
consumptions. These sensors might be provided by other parties, though they belong to
the same environment. The task announcement and the identity of the requester can
implicitly refer to hours of low traffic and sleep time 𝐼𝑟,𝑘 . This information becomes
sensitive in relation with other third parties.
∃ 𝑜𝑝,𝑤 | 𝑜𝑝,𝑤 (𝐼𝑟,𝑡 ) ≡ 𝐼𝑟,𝑘 ∧ IS (𝐼𝑟,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑝 )
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Figure 18. Task announcement is sent to all potential contractors
In traditional CNP, not differentiating potential contractors and sharing the task
announcement discloses sensitive information (Figure 18).
Figure ?.
S(𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , ep ) → D(𝐼𝑟,𝑘 , ep )
The biding structure in CNP includes the identity and node abstraction which include the
specification of the node that is providing the proposal. Node abstraction also includes
the information that the contractor might need in case of being a winner.
<bid> ⇒ BID [name] {node-abstraction}
When entities want to compete with each other over the task, they submit bidding
information with their identity. The exposure boundary of potential contractors’ bidding
information 𝐼𝑝,𝑏 does not include other entities of the environment. Hence, sharing 𝐼𝑝,𝑏
raises privacy concerns. For example, the manger entity realizes about maximum
willingness of entities to get a task 𝐼𝑝,𝑘 . This can be exploited for future interactions [56] ,
[57]. Therefore, the bidding information becomes sensitive in relation with the manager
entity.
IS (Ip,b , 𝑒𝑚 )
∃ 𝑜𝑚,𝑤 | 𝑜𝑚,𝑤 (𝐼𝑝,𝑏 ) ≡ 𝐼𝑝,𝑘 ∧ IS (𝐼𝑝,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑚 )
Where in CNP:
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S(Ip,b , em ) → D(𝐼𝑝,𝑘 , em )
When the contractor is awarded with the task, it performs operations on the task
information and provides the result of the requested task. He exposure boundary of result
description 𝐼𝑟,𝑗 only includes the contractor entity. In traditional CNP, the result
description is submitted to the manager and it forwards it to the requester. This indicates
that 𝐼𝑟,𝑗 is sensitive information in relation with the manager and protection mechanism
should be applied.
Entities in CNP can create sub tasks. The default of sub-contractors in CNP is all entities.
In another word, all entities will receive the task announcement 𝐼𝑟,𝑡 and sub task
information of the requester. 𝐸𝑟,𝑡 only includes the manager entity through which 𝐼𝑟,𝑡
becomes sensitive in relation with subcontractors.
IS (𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , 𝑒𝑠 )
Because {name, task_announcement} becomes the auxiliary information at the sub
contractor entities, it might be used for transforming sensitive implicit information to
explicit. Similar to this case is when the {𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒, 𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘_𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡} is sent to
entities that are not capable of executing the task and therefore, they will not be
competing over the task. However, this information is used as auxiliary information at
𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠: 𝑒𝑛 . Therefore,
IS (𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , 𝑒𝑛 )
𝐸𝑟,ℎ = ∅ which indicates the history of tasks 𝐼𝑟,ℎ at the manager entity is sensitive. This is
due to existing of auxiliary information such as history of allocations of requesters and
contractors among entities might be used for retrieving sensitive information. As an
example, an entity has requested for temperature controlling services 𝐼𝑟,𝑡 over a specific
area in a higher frequency during the last two days 𝐼𝑟,𝑙 . The manager entity using some
auxiliary information 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 such as fire alarm services on that region can transform the
implicit information to explicit information that there was a fire accident (𝐼𝑟,𝑘 ) on the
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entity’s site belonging to that area. This information is sensitive in relation with the
manger entity.
∃ 𝑜𝑚,𝑤 | 𝑜𝑚,𝑤 ({𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , 𝐼𝑟,𝑙 , 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 }, 𝐼𝑟,𝑘 ) ∧ IS (𝐼𝑟,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑚 )
Where in CNP:
S(𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , em ) ∧ 𝑜̿𝑚,𝑤 ({𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , 𝐼𝑟,𝑙 , 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 }) → D(𝐼𝑟,𝑘 , em )
Through this it is deduced that protection mechanisms have to be applied to avoid the
disclosure of sensitive information.
Requesters and contractors potentially can be allocated to each other when similar tasks
are announced. Because the contractor is capable of storing the received task
announcement, it implicitly possesses information about the requester that can be
sensitive. The exposure boundary of 𝐼𝑟,𝑠 does not include any entity 𝐸𝑟,𝑠 = ∅. The
proposed framework can reason accordingly, that this information is sensitive in relation
with the contractor entity. For instance, when the computation analysis of measuring the
required resources for the new project is assigned to a contractor using CNP, monitoring
their results is a period of time can transform the implicit sensitive information such as
stock growth rate of the business in near future. To deal with this, privacy protection
mechanism should be applied to avoid operating on history of tasks that are allocated to a
contractor.
IS (𝐼𝑟,𝑠 , 𝑒𝑐 )

6.3 CNP in privacy protection management framework
In this section, we focus on how the privacy protection management framework
transforms the CNP interaction protocol to privacy based CNP (PB_CNP).

In the

previous subsection, the framework deducted the sensitive information through the
exposure boundaries of the information shared in traditional CNP. This enables the
framework to apply adequate protection mechanism for the identified sensitive
information as part of the interaction protocol.
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6.3.1 Task Announcement
To avoid sharing the combination of task announcement and the identity of the requester
𝐼𝑟,𝑡 , a preventive mechanism at the information level is required. This allows the protocol
to share the information that is required for executing the task. In addition, it manipulates
the information through which the task cannot be attributed to the requester. The
sequence of CNP at this level includes the following operations:
CNP:[REQUEST:TASK_ANNOUNCEMENT,CFP:TASKANNOUNCEMENT]
The framework employs the protection mechanism at this sequence before it is shared
with potential contractors. Among mechanism can be applied at this level are
anonymization or cryptographic mechanism. Therefore, it will be transformed to:
PB_CNP:[REQUEST:TASK_ANNOUNCEMENT,ANONYMIZED_TASK,CFP:TASK
ANNOUNCEMENT]
However to provide the possibility of de-identifying and anonymization of tasks, there
are procedures have to be added to the protocol procedures and message structure should
be modified:




Substituting {𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒} with a task identifier
Mapping the task identifier and the name of entities only is kept in the manager which is
part of the auxiliary information they have about entities
<task-announcement> ⇒ TASK-ANNOUNCEMENT [Task_id] {task-abstraction}
{eligibility-specification} {bid-specification} [expiration-time]

6.3.2 Proposal/Bid
In CNP, the bidding information in conjunction with the identity of the potential
contractors will be sent to participate in winner determination in the manager [broker]
entity. The combination of the bidding value and the identity of the bidder is sensitive in
relation with the manager [56]. This is due to the exposure boundary of this information
which is 𝐸𝑐,𝑏 = ∅ . However, CNP shares this information.
determination is as the following:
𝐶𝑁𝑃: [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙]

The CNP in winner
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One of the mechanisms to protect privacy in this context is applying preventive
mechanisms at the information level using the mechanism proposed in [57] at which
calculation happens on encrypted information and the broker is not aware of the bidding
values. Utilizing this mechanism will extend the protocol with additional processes to
encrypt the bidding information.
𝑃𝐵_𝐶𝑁𝑃: [ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 , 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙]

6.3.3 Result Description
Er,j only includes the contractor which deduces that the result information is sensitive in
relation with the manager. To protect this information, it is required to prevent the
sharing operation (preventive mechanism at the operation level). This enforces the
contractor to identify the owner of the task and directly send the information to them.
Also it is possible to use cryptographic approaches to encrypt the result information with
requester public key (preventive mechanism at the information level). In both cases, the
contractor has to perform a procedure to realize the owner of the request.
CNP: [RESULT]
PB_CNP: [ONWER_REALIZATION, RESULT]

6.3.4 Subcontractors
The operation of sharing and disseminating information to sub contractors may disclose
implicit sensitive information. Contractors can send direct messages to other entities to
allocate some part of the task to them. Therefore, it is required to perform a preventive
mechanism at the operation level. The node abstraction will include the list of sub
contractors. The manager can exclude proposals that include subcontractors that do not
belong to the exposure boundary of subtask information Ir,g . For instance, to perform an
operation on computational resources, only entities that belong to a particular
geographical location are allowed to acquire the task. This inherits to entities that execute
the subtasks. In addition, the sharing operations can be prevented using approaches such
as the work in [72] which only allows execution of operations that are captured as part of
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a contract agreed by participants. To apply these mechanisms, it is required that the
requester includes the exposure boundary of subtasks Er,g as part of the task
announcement.
<task-announcement> ⇒ TASK-ANNOUNCEMENT [Task_id] {task-abstraction}
{eligibility-specification} {bid-specification} [expiration-time] [subtask boundary]

Through this a new procedure at the manager will be applied which extends the
operations at the protocol.
CNP: [TASK_ANNOUNCEMENT, PROPOSE, ACCEPT_PROPOSAL]
PB_CNP:

[ANONYMIZED_TASK,

PROPOSE,

SUBCONTRACTOR_CHECK,

ACCEPT_PROPOSAL]

6.3.5 Non Capable Potential Contractors
Because task information Ir,t is sensitive in relation with potentials contractors that are
not capable of executing the task, it is required to reduce the task announcement phase to
entities that have the capability to execute the task. This requires preventive mechanisms
at the operation level. It includes new messages and sequences at the protocol in which
potential contractors register their capabilities with the manager. This allows the manager
to multicast the task announcement to entities that have the potentials to execute the task.
CNP: []
PB_CNP: [REGISTER,CONFIRM]
This sequence introduces a new procedure at the manager to evaluate the potential
contractors before announcing the task.

6.3.6 Task History
In forms on CNP that the manager and requester entity are not the same, the history of
task allocation is sensitive in relation with the manager IS (Ir,h , 𝑒𝑚 ). Because the manager
uses auxiliary information to perform operations that may not be authorized, a
mechanism at the operation should be performed. The task information is shared during a
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period of time that conducts to new information when they are used altogether. Through
this preventive mechanisms may not be effective and punishing mechanisms is more
adequate. The punishing mechanisms obliged to include an agreement where only certain
set of operations can be applied. This introduces new information and sequences to
extent

the

protocol.

{< 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 >, < 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 >, < 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒 >}

6.3.7 Result History
Because the contractor can convey the history of the tasks that are allocated to it and
perform operations on it, implicit sensitive information might be transformed to explicit
using auxiliary information. This information is shared with the contractor entity in a
period of time. To protect this information punishing mechanisms can be more effective.
These mechanisms require having an agreement between the participants of the
interaction. This introduced the agreement process between the contractor and the
requester (Figure 19).

Figure 19. Result history as sensitive information
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{< 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 >, < 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 >, < 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒 >}

6.3.8 REQUIRED information and Information Specification
In traditional CNP, the potential contractors can request for more information from the
requester to perform a task. The required information is sent through REQUEST message
and its response Ir,𝑦 is carried with INFORMARTION messages. Depending on the
requested information the exposure boundary might change. It could consist the
contractor but it also might not contain the contractor entity. Thus, the required
information might include sensitive information or it may disclose sensitive information
when it is used in combination of task announcement.
IS (Ir,y , 𝑒𝑐 )
The node abstraction is submitted to the manager entity in proposal phase. It includes the
possible information that might be requested if the potential contractor becomes the
contractor. To deal with this, applying protection mechanism at the operation level is
required where the dissemination operation is prevented if the submitted required
information does not match with the node abstraction that the requester has release.
Through this the requester can incorporate the possible extra information in the structure
of node abstraction that potentials entities are part of its exposure boundary into the task
information.
<task-announcement> ⇒ TASK-ANNOUNCEMENT [Task_id] {task-abstraction}
{eligibility-specification} {bid-specification} [expiration-time] [subtask boundary]
[extra_information]
Also, this introduces a new procedure at the manager level to filter the potential
contractors that their requested information does not belong to the exposure boundary in
extra information.
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CNP: [PROPOSE, ACCEP_PROPOSAL]

Figure 20. PB_CNP Sequence Diagram

PB_CNP: [PROPOSE, VERIFIED_INFO , ACCEP_PROPOSAL]
And PB_CNP: [PROPOSE, VERIFIED_INFO , REJECT_PROPOSAL]
Given the above modification, the framework generates a privacy based CNP that is
depicted in Figure 20.
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6.4 Summary
Contract Net Protocol is a negotiation-based protocol used for resolving capability-based
interdependency applied in distributed problem solving. Because of the privacy concerns
in CNP, it may result in unacceptable solutions. Given the exposure boundary of the
information exchanged in the sequences of the protocol, there is sensitive information
that is disclosed to other entities. Applying the privacy protection management
framework identifies the concern points of the protocol and provides adequate privacy
protection mechanisms that creates a privacy-based contract net interaction protocol.
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Chapter 7

7

Privacy aware CDS Model: Application Scenarios

Many practical applications can be effectively modeled as CDS environments. They can
involve with various services, information sources, devices, equipments and sensors.
Internet of Things is one example that can be effectively modeled as CDS. Along this
direction Smart-Space is a research initiative at our CDS-Eng research Lab, through
which we investigate, several critical research issues, including privacy concerns in open
environments. Additionally, two projects within IoT smart space initiative have been
included in our research investigation, namely Grid-based resource scheduling and
intelligent assistance. In this chapter we elaborate on the feasibility of applying the
proposed privacy protection management framework in these application scenarios.

7.1 Smart Space
A smart space project has been implemented as an Internet of Things (IoT) environment
in Cooperative Distributed Systems Engineering (CDS-ENG) research lab. It includes
sensors, equipment, services and data resources that are exposed to applications. Within
this environment, there are entities modeled as agents. Services in this environment
utilize the existing resources in the space and deliver solutions to applications. A
brokering layer provides functionalities to integrate with resources of the environment
including data, services, clouds and events.

7.1.1 Setting of Smart Space
Smart space includes entities with various types of capabilities. They are modeled as
agents within the environment. Diverse set of devices, sensors and equipment are used in
smart space such as kinects, twines, mindstorm, IP cameras, NFC and RFID tags and
android-based mobile devices. The logical architecture of the smart space is shown in
Figure 21. Many applications and services are created by utilization of these “things”
that are registered within this environment. The “thing” layer mainly refers to the
physical devices and application layer encompasses the application and services
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Figure 21. Logical architecture of smart space
presented in smart space. The brokering layer contains four main components to provide
knowledge, services, events and resource broker. The Service Broker (SB) is responsible
in delivering the requested services to entities. Knowledge Broker (KB) provides a
unified view on many data sources and makes it available to entities on their demand.
Event Broker (EB) allows entities to register for notifications on occurrence of events to
response effectively. The Cloud/Resources Broker (C/RB) provides the scheduling
services and resource allocation to entities of the environment. The JIAC platform is
providing necessary platform services to accommodate the agents of the environment. In
addition, entities in smart space have interdependency problem. To resolve their
capability interdependency, we have applied CNP protocol where the brokering entities
act as the manager entity.
Entities in smart space are modeled as CIR agents. Because of limited computation
capabilities of some of the sensors, the communication part of the CIR-agent model is
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Figure 22. Deployment Diagram
integrated at device and interaction, knowledge and problem solving are incorporated at
the components of applications. In result the “thing” layer and application layer are
deployed at the same node in some cases. The deployment diagram of smart space is
provided in Figure 22.
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7.2 Privacy in IoT Environments
The motivation of smart space was to create an IoT environment where various types of
“things” could join the environment and utilize and provide services of the environment.
The IoT is becoming the newest computation environment with the interconnection of
software and information services, devices, equipment, and sensors. These “things” are
able to communicate with each other via the Internet [73]. The future growth of IoT
based applications is foreseen to be tremendous [74]. The incorporation of social
networks and ubiquitous computing technologies in IoT enables individuals and groups
of people to interact seamlessly with the environment [75], [76], [77]. The comfort
experienced via innovative technologies in IoT is with the expenses of privacy [2], [3],
[78]. The more one engages with IoT based applications and their enabling technologies,
the more privacy concerns arise [79], [80], [81]. As an example, magnet sensors enable
opening doors through the internet. However, for security reasons, they are connected to
video sensors which authorize people at the entrance. Applying facial recognition
programs on videos combined with the frequency of appearances of people at the house
front, may identify members of the family, including children. Using Facebook’s facial
recognition software also makes it possible to find their Facebook profiles and, possibly,
the school that they are going to [82], [83].
As the smart space inherits the characteristics of IoT, privacy becomes a challenge within
this environment. Since IoT is modeled as CDS, we have applied the privacy protection
management framework at the interaction protocols applied in this space. However, the
“things” might refer to small sensors that do not have the computation power to manage
the requirements of the privacy-based interaction protocol. Due to limited capacity in
some “things” of the environment, we have deployed the interaction capabilities on the
nodes in which the components coexist with the components of application layer as
depicted in Figure 22. In addition, the traditional CNP was replaced with the privacybased CNP presented in Chapter 6.
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7.3 Privacy based Scheduling Protocol in Smart Space

Figure 23. Resource Broker High Level View

The resource broker in smart space provides scheduling and resource allocation services
to the entities of the environment. The resources can include grids, clouds and single
entities with computation power through which various cloud providers including IaaS,
PaaS and SaaS can be connected to the smart space. The cloud-computing paradigm can
be classified as IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), or SaaS
(Software as a Service), where the resources in terms of infrastructure, platform, and
software are provisioned as services [84], [27], [85]. Cloud environments can encompass
various types of entities from a grid entity to smaller sensors [86]. Figure 23 shows the
high level view of the architecture of the resource broker in smart space. The scheduling
mechanism in resource brokering is extracted using the work in [87] and the scheduling
interaction is presented in Figure 24.
Due to exchange of information in interactions with the resource broker in smart space,
privacy becomes a concern at the scheduling interactions. Consider the following
example: in a CDS, we have two entities, 𝑒𝑖 and 𝑒𝑗 , that provide computational resources.
𝑒𝑘 and 𝑒𝑦 are two entities that require computational resources. 𝑒𝑏 is a resource scheduler
that allocates resources to entities based on their time and price boundaries. If 𝑒𝑏
allocates 𝑒𝑖 as the resource provider for 𝑒𝑘 , then 𝑒𝑗 becomes the only available resource
provider. If the job that 𝑒𝑘 has shared with 𝑒𝑏 reaches to 𝑒𝑗 , then 𝑒𝑗 knows it does not
have competitors and it increases the price of the service. This affects the job that 𝑒𝑦 has
posted to 𝑒𝑏 . Either the price is not in the range of 𝑒𝑦 price boundaries and the job cannot
be done, or it has to be delayed until 𝑒𝑘 s job execution is finalized. This scenario one of
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the forms of privacy concerns that is referred as “Price Discrimination”[88] , [89]. This is
due to the unauthorized disclosure of information to 𝑒𝑗 . In this case, 𝑒𝑏 caused privacy
concerns for 𝑒𝑦 as well as 𝑒𝑖 . Given such an environment, it is essential that entities
receive privacy protection when coordinating with each other in resolving schedules.
Within the scheduling interaction protocol in resource broker, combinations of tasks and
the identities of entities can disclose information about those entities. Operating on tasks
that are attributed to an entity can reveal information regarding the pattern of the work in
the entity, as well as identify highly loaded time slots of a certain entity. This information
can be used to implement more effective DoS or DDoS attacks against the entity. This
indicates the need for a preventive protection mechanism at the information level, such as
anonymization.
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Figure 24. . Scheduling interaction protocol in resource broker in smart space
Similarly, a combination of “propose message” and the bidding value may become
sensitive when it discloses the maximum willingness of an entity to acquire a task. For
example, in a second price auction mechanism, the auctioneer can start an auction with
higher value when they are aware of the existence of an entity that is willing to pay the
proposed value. One mechanism that protects the information of proposed messages is
the application of the preventive protection mechanism introduced in [57].
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Figure 25. Scheduling solution space

7.3.1 Privacy-based Scheduling Solution
The approach in resolving the privacy problem as a quality factor in scheduling is
intended to limit the solution space for entities that can provide the necessary privacy
protection. As shown in Figure 25, the scheduling solution considers all entities as part of
the solution space. Then it identifies the entity that can resolve a scheduling request.
PPL and the risk measures are the parameters that can be used as decision variables of
scheduling solution or as constraint variables in the solution space. In the presented work,
we focused on the latter. Figure 26 illustrates that the privacy protection mechanism
reduces the solution space by eliminating the interactions that do not have the requested

Figure 26. Privacy based scheduling solution space
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PPL and risk value.
By applying protection mechanisms of anonymization [64] and private-bidcommunication [57], the privacy based scheduling interaction is achieved as depicted in
Figure 27. These operations can be substituted with other protection mechanisms such as
𝑀1 and 𝑀2 , with protection levels 𝑃𝑃𝐿1 and 𝑃𝑃𝐿2 , that serve the desired level of PPL.
Applying these mechanisms in the privacy protection management framework results in a
privacy based interaction protocol with protection level 𝑃𝑃𝐿1 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐿2 . The risk value is
calculated once the job is submitted to the scheduler. This encourages the scheduler not
to consider entities with high levels of risk in disclosing the information.
As the privacy-based scheduling interaction protocol reduces the solution space to
entities that privacy is protected with a certain degree, the scheduling mechanism can rely
on the assumption that privacy is protected. Therefore, any solution that the scheduler
provides is within the privacy-based solution space and thus it is acceptable.
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Figure 27. Privacy-based Scheduling Interaction Protocol

7.4 Privacy in Personal Assistant
The explosion of online, mobile, and social networks transformed computation into a
platform that redefines many aspects of our personal and business lives. As a result,
many of our goals are technology driven and, for us to be able to achieve these goals, we
might need to go through several applications and services. Within smart space we
provide intelligence assistant that follows the models of personal assistant for the users of
the environment. The architecture of the smart assistant in smart space within the CIR
agent is depicted in Figure 28 [90]. Interaction is managed in the environment model, and
the proposed privacy framework is applied in interaction protocols at this level.
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Personal assistants are smart software agents that provide users with services that can
adapt to the user and the environment [91]. A cognitive user model is an essential
component in personal assistants. Our focus is on proposing a user behavior model that
captures users’ behaviors in open environments [92], [93].
In this context, users’ privacy is a concern when interacting with other entities in smart
space through their PAs (Personal Assistants). Users’ interests are considered sensitive
information, which might be disclosed to other entities [59], [60]. For instance,
promoting movies, books, software, web sites, and other products regarding a particular
heritage, religion, or group of people with a shared political or social opinion,
demonstrates users’ interests about these topics, which may be a privacy concern. Identity
and interest information about users can be used as implicit information in conjunction
with other operations.

Figure 28. Personal Assistant Architecture

7.5 Privacy Based Personal Assistant
By sharing explicit information of users’ interests (such as grocery items, favourite
books, etc), we might implicitly disclose sensitive information. Providers may exist in the
boundary of users’ interest information. However, the exposure boundary of users’
interest information, such as their favourite book, does not include entities offering jobs
or insurance. Users’ interest in horror story book may prevent them from getting job
opportunities in nursing. Therefore, employers do not belong to the exposure boundary of
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favourite book information. Similarly, purchasing cancer treatment books may imply that
the user may suffer from cancer. This information is sensitive in relation with insurance
recommendations. In Smart space, entities apply anonymization and pseudonymity with
adequate levels of PPL when interacting with entities that provide assistance. Applying
the privacy protection management framework within the personal assistant reduces the
assistances that are offered to the user for which the privacy is considered. However,
depending on the exposure boundary of interest information, the assistance is filtered by
the privacy-based interaction protocol.

7.6 Summary
In CDS-Eng research lab, a smart space project is defined in which includes diverse set of
sensors, equipment and devices to form an IoT environment and is modeled as CDS.
“things” in smart space are modeled as agents that interact with other agents in smart
space. Because of the increased involvement of people and their devices in IoT
applications, privacy has become a more complex challenge. Hence, we have applied
privacy-based interaction protocol in smart space.
One component of the brokering layer in smart space is resource broker that delivers
scheduling service using scheduling interaction protocol. However, privacy within this
setting is still a concern. As entities in these environments are autonomous and selfinterested, it is assumed that all entities will respect privacy. Any scheduling solution that
results in privacy concerns will not be acceptable. Therefore, privacy becomes a quality
factor of the scheduling solution. The interaction of entities in scheduling will be
transformed through privacy-based scheduling interaction protocols which enable
scheduling engines to delegate privacy concerns to interaction protocols. The scheduler
can assume that all entities respect privacy, as the interaction protocol has reduced the
solution space to privacy protected boundaries.
Intelligent assistants in smart space are provided through personal assistants that interact
with the environment to provide relevant assistance. Due to sensitivity of interest
information of users, personal assistants of smart space apply the privacy protection
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management through which it enables users to receive relevant assistance from providers
that their interaction conveys acceptable level of privacy protection.
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Chapter 8

8

Conclusion and Future Work

The goal of this research is to provide a formal treatment of “privacy” as a fundamental
computation concept in CDS paradigm to build a privacy-aware CDS framework and
platform. The formal model of privacy served as a base for developing a privacy
protection management framework for CDS. It includes a privacy-aware agent model for
CDS

platform

with

the

ability

to

support

interaction-based

privacy

protection. Additionally, the feasibility of the proposed models has been demonstrated by
developing an agent-based CDS platform using JIAC framework in an IoT-based project
of smart space and a privacy-based Contract Net Protocol.

8.1 Summary of contributions
An important class of distributed systems is CDS, in which entities are able to exercise
some degree of authority in sharing their capabilities. Entities in this paradigm are
expected to cooperate to achieve individual or collective goals. Due to interdependency
problem among entities, they require the coordination of their activities using
interactions. In the message-based form of interactions, entities exchange information
through autonomous and self-interested entities, and thus their privacy becomes a
concern. In CDS, solutions are accomplished through the participation of several entities
where each has only part of the solution. This positions CDS as a computation platform
in which the computation occurs at entities’ interactions.

This entails that privacy

challenges in CDS are the concerns associated to the computation happening at the
interaction level.

8.1.1 Challenges and Contributions
Privacy, by nature is a concept that is defined with many denotations, which could be
interpreted differently in various contexts. Understanding privacy as a concept that can
be applied in contexts such as CDS requires formal analysis of settings in which privacy
is not negligible. Despite existing privacy models proposed in many contexts, attendance
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to privacy models that capture privacy at computation and is adequate for CDS is lacking.
To address privacy as part of the quality of the solutions that are reached in CDS, a
certain degree of the privacy protection should be guaranteed during entities’ interaction.
Furthermore, an approach is required to properly apply the privacy model at the
interaction level to enable privacy protection as part of the computation in CDS.
The perspective about privacy in related works can be categorized into two major areas.
First is verifying the legitimacy of the achieved solution after applying the privacy
constraining rules. Secondly, incorporating privacy in the solution as a computation
concept. To resolve privacy concerns in CDS, it is essential that privacy is modelled in a
context that is adequate for CDS environments. There are many related works that have
addressed privacy in contexts that are not capable of encompassing the complete settings
of applications in CDS environments.

For instance, the differential privacy and its

affiliated applied mechanisms are aimed for statistical data analysis contexts. CDS is a
broader area where it is essential to provide a privacy model that is applicable in it.
Modeling privacy in information management context can be categorized as information
collection, information processing and information dissemination through which it can
adequately be applied in CDS environments. Modeling the solution for privacy is
typically classified as rule-based and architectural-based approaches. Due to
inconveniences of rule-based approaches in dynamic environments, architectural-based
approaches are more desirable for CDS environments. In this work, we pursue the
computation view on privacy within the information management context and adopt the
architectural-based solution approaches by applying the model at the interaction level.

8.1.2 Formal Modeling of privacy
Due to lack of formal analysis on privacy that is adequate for CDS, in this work we
proposed a formal model for privacy in an information management context. Privacy is
the concern of decentralized environments where the control and knowledge are
distributed among autonomous, self-interested entities and they need to adopt messagebased interactions through which information is shared. Sharing is a supervised process
by entities, and as such depending on the receiver of the information, the entity does not
share the information that is classified as sensitive. Information can be sensitive in
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relation to an entity and become non-sensitive in relation to another. It creates an
exposure boundary for any information that the entity possesses. This entails privacy is
the state of the exposure boundary for which information is not sensitive when it flows
within the exposure boundary and it becomes sensitive when it is outside this boundary.
Information exists as explicit forms, however, it can be implicitly available when
information is used in conjunction with operations. Manipulation of information by
operations can transfer the information outside of their exposure boundary. The
“disclosure” of information refers to explicitly or implicitly making the information
available at the receiver entity. The “privacy concern” within this context relates to
disclosing sensitive implicit information. Any operation that transforms the sensitive
implicit information to explicit form becomes non-authorized. The Execution of nonauthorized operations when there is agreement between the two parties to not apply the
operation refers to privacy violation. Preventing or neutralizing the execution of nonauthorized operations becomes the privacy protection definition.
The security mechanisms are mainly applied at the exposure boundary controlling the
sharing process. However, these mechanisms are not sufficient to manage the disclosure
of sensitive implicit information, which happens outside of the exposure boundary.
Perfect privacy protection happens when all non-authorized operations are prevented or
neutralized. Due to the incomplete knowledge of entities in CDS, perfect protection
might not be attainable and quasi protection mechanisms will be applied. To address the
uncertainty level of privacy protection in quasi mechanisms, a probabilistic model is
proposed that reflects conditional probability of privacy protection given the information
that exists at the entity. This concept is addressed as Privacy Protection Level (PPL).
The trust concept is the degree of entities’ belief over the reliability of an entity on
executing or not executing certain set of operations. Therefore, this concept can impact
the level of probability that the unauthorized operations are applied which is reflected on
PPL value.
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8.1.3 Solution for privacy within CDS environments
Many computation approaches are applied in some settings of CDS environments for
which not all CDS applications can adopt them. Providing the privacy concern solution at
the interaction level allows for the adoption of the framework by CDS-based
environments. The proposed privacy protection framework models the protection
mechanisms as operations and classifies them at preventive and punishing mechanisms.
The protection mechanisms can be applied to the information by distorting or altering the
information. It also can happen to the operation by not allowing certain operations to be
executed. Interactions between entities can be captured in information management and
be categorized as information collection, processing and dissemination. The interaction
protocol can be modeled as a set of messages and a set of sequences of exchange of
messages. Furthermore, interaction protocols can be modeled as a set of operations that
are executed in the sequences presented in the interaction protocol. By applying the
privacy model at the interaction protocol, the adequate privacy protection mechanism is
added to the operations of the interaction protocol. In the end, the framework expands the
interaction protocol with proper messages and sequences that reflects on the protection
that is applied on the interaction protocol.
It is proven in this work that protection at the interaction protocol is sufficient for
protecting privacy in CDS environments. Also, the generated privacy-based interaction
protocol has quantifiable privacy protection level that allows entities to interact with a
certain degree of protection.
Entities in CDS have an interdependency problem for which they need to interact in order
to reach to a solution. The computation entity within CDS can be adequately be modeled
as CIR agents that have knowledge, problem solving capabilities, interactions and
communications. The solution within such a computation platform is achieved by
conjunction of problem solving and coordination solution, which can be managed by
interactions. However, the solution that is achieved might not be acceptable if the privacy
concerns are not resolved. Within this work, we have applied the privacy protection
management framework at the computation level by expanding the structure of the entity
to include privacy protection management that adheres to the privacy-based interaction
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protocol. In this work, we have formally explained that legitimate acceptable solutions at
the computation require the inclusion of privacy resolution in-addition to problem solving
and coordination.

8.1.4 Privacy-Based Contract net protocol
Contract Net Protocol (CNP) is a negotiation-based interaction protocol that is used for
distributed problem solving. Entities within CNP can be autonomous and self-interested,
allowing this protocol to be associable in CDS. Application of the privacy models and the
proposed privacy protection management framework on CDS identifies the privacy
concerns related to this protocol. By utilizing the proposed framework as an analytical
tool as well as applying it at the computation entity, it is possible to expand this protocol
with the necessary privacy protection operations.

8.1.5 Implementation Challenges
To implement the privacy-aware computation, we have used the JIAC agent platform that
provides the necessary functionalities for communication and agent life cycle
management. This platform does not include the interaction mechanisms at the agent
level and everything is tailored to actions within agents. To resolve interactions at the
JIAC platform, we have introduced the interaction as an agent bean that follows the
sequences and messages it receives. Sequence management is performed by providing a
state management class that creates and monitors the states of the interaction protocol.
The challenge regarding the expansion of the interaction protocol with protection
operations is resolved by introducing protection operations that are registered with the
knowledge of the entity and at the same time are introduced as available actions. To
enable adaptation of the interaction protocol with various PPL levels and different
interaction protocol, the actions are added to the agent node memory before the entity
gets to the start state at the initialing phase. The protection operations that are simulated
within the JIAC platform are pseudonymity, private bid transfer, early registration and
applying agreements. The PINQ platform [95] also is one of the anonymizer operations
that can be applied as protection operations.
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The proposed privacy framework can be applied in many applications that are modeled
by CDS. In this work, we have shown the project of smart space that is an IoT-based
environment that is modeled as CDS and the proposed privacy protection management
framework is applied to them. Similarly, the scheduling interaction protocol within the
resource broker of smart space is substituted with privacy-based scheduling interaction
protocol that reduces the scheduling solution space to the ones where privacy is
respected. In another example, the proposed privacy protection framework is applied in
personal assistance applications where users’ interests are sensitive information and still
are shared with the assistant providers.
Although a level of privacy protection is achievable within the presented work, privacy
violation is bound to disobeying the agreement among participant entities. The agreement
includes operations that are considered to be non-authorized. Theoretically, within an
environment, any state changes if an operation is applied. This indicates that all the
operations can be addressed by capturing the states of the environment. However, from a
practical perspective, it is envisioned to have environments in which knowing the nonauthorized operations might not be possible for the entities. Therefore, the entity would
not be able to set proper agreements. In any privacy based interaction, there is (1 −
𝑃𝑃𝐿) chance that the privacy protection is not provided which entails the probability of
transforming the implicit information to explicit by execution of non-authorized
operations. Evidently, not having adequate mechanisms to avoid privacy violation
impacts the level of risks within interaction.

8.2 Future Work
Our contributions were mainly in the areas of modeling and categorizing privacy, formal
analysis of privacy within information management, computational view on privacy at
the interaction protocol and providing privacy aware computation systems. However, this
approach can be expanded within the areas of economic-based privacy model and
optimization of privacy protection management.


Privacy Protection Management in Computation
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Due to the incomplete knowledge of entities in CDS, attaining perfect protection with
adhering to preventive mechanisms is challenging. This drives the application of quasi
privacy protection mechanisms that are subject to levels of uncertainty on strength or the
confidence factor of the applied mechanisms. The uncertainty associated with protection
mechanisms are captured by measuring the PPL value. The probability inherited in this
merit reflects the probability of the protection and the probability of privacy concerns
occurring. As an example if PPL=0.75, there will be 25% chance that the privacy
concerns will occur.
The decision-making process happening at the entity level can accept the chance of a
privacy concern by measuring the risk of interaction. This is in direct relation with utility
and the accepted level of PPL in general while interacting with other entities. Therefore,
it becomes a multi-objective problem to allocate proper protection operations with an
adequate level of PPL which is serving the expected utility and requested protection. The
remaining questions concern understating the relationship between the requested PPL and
the utility that is expected as well as the risk elements that might impact the requested
PPL.


Risk analysis

The risk of interactions related to the probability of occurrence of the negative impact of
the privacy concerns entities. It has been captured as a probabilistic model which can
include several parameters involved. It is clear that the risk of interaction has significant
impact on decision-making process of entities. Computationally, this concept has to be
captured at the interaction level. Identifying and encapsulating the parameters impacting
the risk of interaction and extend the interaction protocols to adhere to risk analysis in
one of the questions that we are going to answer in future works of this research.
Furthermore, optimizing the level of risks, the level of protection and the level of utility
to serve entities objective in their interactions still requires investigation.


Punishing mechanism
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The punishing classes of protection mechanisms are technically mitigation operations that
reduce the desire to violate privacy at the receiver side due to the consequences that
might be imposed on them by their agreements. The effect of the incentives or the
punishments that are integrated as part of the agreement can be measured by an analysis
of the probabilities of existing strategies for the entities. This becomes an approach for
evaluating the PPL associated with punishing mechanisms. One of the approaches
towards the agreements of the punishing mechanisms is through the economic-based
modeling of the privacy-based interactions through which the punishing mechanisms
provide sufficient incentives for complying with the agreement. Nevertheless, punishing
mechanisms in the context of an economic mechanism requires further analysis and
research challenges that need to be addressed.

8.2.1 Areas of Expansion


Economic-based Privacy Model

Economic mechanisms are adequate models for managing interactions in decentralized
systems. There have been several attempts to apply economic mechanisms to solve
complex decision problems in CDS [87], [96]. In this work, privacy is captured at the
interaction level where decisions to resolve interdependency problems are made. Also, it
is observed that entities decide on the exposure boundary based on their evaluation of the
utility and possible privacy impact [14, 66]. Applications of quasi protection mechanisms
convey certain levels of probability that the privacy concerns may occur after sharing
information. In economic mechanisms, the dominant strategies are the mechanisms that
the best possible choice of entities is what the mechanism is aimed for. For instance, in
second price auction, the mechanisms provide incentive for entities to reveal their true
valuation [97]. Modeling privacy using economic based approaches can provide
alternatives in which entities willingly consider the privacy of others. Because entities are
economically rational, the expected outcome is the elimination of the chance of executing
operation that transforms non-sensitive information into sensitive. Therefore, the solution
to privacy can behave as perfect protection mechanisms.


Semantic-Driven Privacy Protection Management
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Entities in open environments require the sharing of a similar understanding of the reality
and the concepts defined in their knowledge to interact. Due to differences on the
semantics that entities adopt, semantic integration is essential quality factor for open
environments. This also includes agreeing on the semantics of the interaction protocol.
Therefore, the privacy protection management framework requires resolving the semantic
integration at the interaction protocol before performing the protection operations. This
opens a new perspective on the proposed model that is considered in the future works of
this research.
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